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Abstract 
Relevance Theory (Sperber & Wilson 1986/1995) is a theory of communication which states that 
the human brain is geared towards processing relevant stimuli for little effort. While proponents 
of Relevance Theory have endeavored to explain various linguistic phenomena such as 
metaphor, irony, sarcasm, and idioms, there has been little work done on the proverb. The 
current thesis fills in this gap within Relevance Theory by applying Relevance-Theoretic 
principles to the interpretation of proverbs in context. This study explains how proverb meaning 
carries both a base meaning as well as an implicated meaning in context, with the use of 
Relevance Theory’s explicatures and implicatures. In addition, this thesis makes use of ad hoc 
concept formation (Wilson & Carston 2007) to account for meaning modulation and contrasts 
the analysis of proverbs under Relevance Theory with Vega-Moreno’s (2003) analysis of idioms 
under Relevance Theory. 
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1. Introduction 
They say that a picture is worth a thousand words and if that were truly the case, this thesis 
would be complete with only a slideshow. Proverbs have a way of giving a general truth in a 
terse and poetic manner even though the speakers of the language know they are not applicable 
in every situation. It takes someone with wisdom to utter the right proverb at the right time; so 
says Lord John Russell: proverbs are “the wisdom of many and the wit of one” (Taylor 1962: 3). 
The use of the proverb a picture is worth a thousand words carries a general meaning (the 
wisdom of many; images communicate a lot with a little) and a specific application in a specific 
context (the wit of one). This will be the main thrust of the thesis, to explain how proverbs carry 
meaning in context. 
Proverbs are (relatively) fixed, poetic phrases which typically offer a nugget of some 
culturally approved wisdom. By way of example, here are several common English proverbs 
presented in (1). 
(1) a. Look before you leap. 
b. He who hesitates is lost. 
c. Out of sight, out of mind. 
d. Absence makes the heart grow fonder. 
e. Don’t judge a book by its cover. 
f. Birds of a feather flock together. 
g. Where there’s smoke there’s fire. 
h. The bigger they come, the harder they fall. 
While it may be easy for a native speaker of English to identify the meaning of each of these 
proverbs, there are in fact several layers of meaning that become apparent on closer examination. 
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Perhaps a proverb from another language will highlight this more clearly: consider the following 
proverb in (2) from Tshiluba (Niger-Congo; Ku-Mesu 1996: 110). 
(2) The bean is destroyed by the very insect that lives in it. 
Ku-Mesu presented several African proverbs such as the proverb in (2) to a group of participants 
from around the world who had no prior knowledge of the cultures from which the proverbs 
came. If you were to guess at the meaning of (2), what would you say? The responses in (3) 
represent some of the responses of Ku-Mesu’s participants (1996: 110-111). Only one of them is 
correct. 
(3) a. Man is his own enemy. 
 b. You will be harmed by the very person that is closest to you. 
 c. We are responsible for the environment … in which we live. 
Ku-Mesu’s study brings up several interesting observations that pertain to the current thesis. 
First, notice how each of the responses in (3) are more literal than the proverb given in (2). 
People often give a literal paraphrase of metaphorical proverbs; the base meaning of a proverb is 
more literal than its original form. 
 The given interpretations fell into three categories (individualistic, environmental, or 
communal) each of which is represented by the responses in (3). Each of these interpretations 
could be appropriate if the proverb is uttered in isolation; the participants, in their search for 
relevance (see Chapter 2), came up with a solution that satisfied their expectations of what the 
proverb meant. However, cultural context is such an important factor here, that two of the three 
categories of interpretation would be deemed incorrect (individualistic and environmental). The 
correct response is (3b). There is an appropriate traditional meaning within the culture that the 
proverb comes from and this “cultural information is needed to accurately formulate the base 
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meaning” (Aasland 2012: 138). This is the common cultural understanding (see Aasland 2012) 
that is necessary for a phrase (or proverb) to enter the lexicon with a smaller set of meanings than 
would otherwise be expected.  
 In addition to the importance of cultural context, Ku-Mesu’s (1996) study also shows the 
importance of situational context. In some of their responses, participants of her study attempted 
to create a context in which each proverb would be properly understood. With proverb use, there 
will often be an application of the general truth to a particular situation, and so the participants of 
the study made artificial situational contexts to explain the meaning of some of the proverbs. 
 The layers of meaning briefly sketched in the discussion of this proverb can be explained 
by Relevance Theory (Sperber & Wilson 1986/1996). While Relevance Theory has been used to 
describe many other linguistic phenomena such as metaphor, idioms, irony, and sarcasm, 
proponents of the theory have not ventured very far into the territory of proverbs. Relevance 
Theory is a pragmatic theory which theorizes that humans are guided by a search for relevance, 
seeking adequate cognitive effects (that is, adjustments to the hearer’s representation of the 
world; Clark 2013: 77-78) for little effort, generally speaking. In doing so, communication 
requires that hearers interpret each utterance to arrive at premises and conclusions that align with 
their search for relevance. This includes both explicit and implicit information communicated by 
an utterance, both of which are essential when it comes to understanding proverbs. By applying 
Relevance-Theoretic principles to the interpretation of proverbs in context this thesis attempts to 
provide a robust account of the pragmatic use of proverbs. 
There have been a few articles within Relevance Theory that mention proverbs. Of these, 
several of them (see Wilson 2009, Pegulescu 2016, and El-Bahy 2019) are focused on translating 
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proverbs from other languages. Each of these authors uses Relevance Theory as a backdrop but 
does not provide the depth of application that will be done in this thesis. 
I will mention two studies related to Relevance Theory here: Ramírez (2015) and Soi 
(2014). Ramírez (2015) notes rightly that there has been little application of Gricean pragmatics 
and other pragmatic theories to the analysis of proverbs. However, Ramírez does not discuss 
implicatures and explicatures (see Section 2.3, this thesis) as I do here; Ramírez instead focuses 
on how utterances of proverbs should be relevant enough to achieve appropriate cognitive effects 
such as to criticize, to advise, and to warn (2015: 19). A study by Soi (2014) has a more detailed 
application of Relevance Theory to proverb use; however, her perspective has a different range 
of focus, commenting on the aspects of proverbs that make them more or less relevant: recency 
of use, frequency of use, linguistic complexity, and logical complexity (2014: 91). I will be 
making much more specific claims than the studies that have come before when it comes to 
meaning modulation and understanding proverbs in context. 
1.1 A note on data 
Data sets are vital to arguing for the acceptance or rejection of a hypothesis. Since this paper is 
largely theoretical, it will focus on a smaller set of examples in order to explain different facets 
of the theory. Chapter 4 contains the application of the theoretical framework to the 
interpretation of proverbs and thus contains data from several sources. Some data come from the 
Corpus of Contemporary American English (COCA; Davies 2008-), a few are created, and 
several other proverb examples in context are the result of ethnographic work of proverb 
scholars. In order to be effective in persuasion, all data in that chapter will be given a sufficient 
context in order to increase the validity of each point argued. 
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 The majority of the data will be English proverbs. This is because the understanding of 
proverbs often relies on an implicit knowledge of their meaning in the culture; the lexicalization 
of overly used phrases (e.g. proverbs) sometimes results in interpretations that do not rely on the 
form of the phrase. This is a key aspect of my theory and thus, in order to retain the validity of 
my argument, the data will be in the mother tongue of the author. However, several examples 
will be offered in other languages (see Section 4.5) as a point of comparison. 
1.2 Overview of the paper 
Chapter 2 of this thesis, “Relevance Theory,” lays the theoretical foundations for the analysis of 
proverbs. It begins with the roots of Gricean pragmatics (Grice 1957, 1975) and explains the 
potential advantages that Relevance Theory (Sperber & Wilson 1986/1995) has over the Gricean 
approach in the analysis of metaphor, loose talk, and proverbs. 
 Chapter 3 “Proverbs” is our introduction to the meaning of proverb. It will discuss what a 
proverb is, what it is not, and explain some characteristics and structural features of proverbs. Of 
note, this chapter gives an overview of other theoretical frameworks for explaining proverbs 
(where some are more thorough than others) with a focus on pragmatic theories. I will not be 
dealing with speech acts of proverbs; for a good summary of speech acts and proverbs see 
Jesenšek (2014). 
 Chapter 4 “Applying Relevance Theory to proverbs” is the culmination of the research 
done on this thesis. It will explain my theoretical propositions for the interpretation of proverbs 
using Relevance Theory to a degree that has not yet been done under the theory. My own 
contributions include how proverbs should be understood under Relevance Theory and how 
proverbs compare to idioms under Relevance Theory. In short, I will discuss how proverbs are 
similar to and different from idioms, how proverbs are understood as metaphors, and how ad hoc 
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concept formation (Wilson & Carston 2007) plays a significant role in meaning modulation. I 
will also make use of Ariel’s (2002, 2008) Privileged Interactional Interpretation, which is the 
meaning that a speaker is committed to in context, independent of the form of the utterance.  
 Chapter 5 “Conclusion” offers the summary of the thesis, thoughts on limitations of the 
current study, and future directions for possible research. 
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2. Relevance Theory 
Relevance Theory, developed by Sperber & Wilson (1986/1995), is a cognitive theory of 
communication which attempts to explain all forms of communication, both explicit and implicit. 
It assumes that the salience (or relevance) of stimuli in a communication act influences the 
hearer’s interpretation of a speaker’s utterance. The relevant stimuli can range from word choice 
to intonation to context – anything that may affect the interpretation of the utterance. Relevance 
Theory explains how we understand utterances, especially when they are incomplete or when 
they deviate from a more literal reading. In Relevance Theory, literal is taken to mean an 
utterance that has the “same propositional form as [a speaker’s] thought” (Sperber & Wilson 
1986/1995: 233; cf. pp. 231-237). As we will see in our discussion on loose talk (Section 2.1.2), 
the propositional form of an utterance is not always the same as the propositional form of the 
speaker’s thought. The current chapter will offer a summary of Relevance Theory and argue that 
it is sufficient to deal with the phenomenon of proverbs. 
To begin with, there are many pragmatic theories and not all of them are equal. Perhaps 
the most influential contribution to the field is that of Grice (1957, 1975) who broke away from 
discussing language as a code, using strict rules to encode and decode messages, and into 
something Sperber & Wilson (1986/1995: 2) call an inferential model, based on the 
interpretation of evidence. This chapter begins with some theoretical roots of Relevance Theory 
which can be seen in Grice. Section 2.1 will give an account of Gricean pragmatics and its 
contribution to linguistics. Grice’s theory was a fundamental shift in developing a discussion of 
everyday meaning; however, it will not prove adequate to examining proverbs. Section 2.2 of 
this chapter will discuss Relevance Theory’s response to Gricean pragmatics and how it evolved 
out of an attempt to improve it. The theory is a post-Gricean pragmatic theory since Sperber and 
Wilson have largely replaced Grice’s maxims rather than merely revising them (Clark 2013). 
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Section 2.3 gets into the details of explicatures and implicatures within Relevance Theory which 
are pragmatically derived interpretations of an utterance. 
2.1 A post-Gricean theory 
Grice’s contributions to the philosophy of language had a profound impact for pragmatics and 
the importance of inference in meaning understanding. He first came onto the scene in 1957 with 
an article titled “Meaning”, discussing the ways in which the meaning derived through 
communication is inherently different than the meaning that one would derive naturally in the 
world. An example of this natural meaning would be when we infer that clouds mean rain or that 
red splotches on the skin mean a rash. This natural meaning has nothing to do with an intention 
to communicate. When Grice talks about meaning and language, he is referring to intentional 
communication which he calls non-natural meaning. 
In 1957 we see the beginnings of his developments of the Cooperative Principle and for 
rules governing the transmission of information between human beings. Meaning is a form of 
cooperation between participants in addition to the propositional forms the utterance may 
represent. Although he holds that the propositional, logical form is still the underlying form, he 
develops maxims of communication to account for the apparent discrepancy in what is spoken 
and what is meant. His analysis attempts to solve the ‘problem’ of literal meaning, something 
which is key in our understanding of proverbs. In Section 2.1.1, we will discuss some of the 
details and examples of Grice’s principles and maxims and Section 2.1.2 will show Sperber and 
Wilson’s response. 
2.1.1 The Cooperative Principle and its maxims 
This is the heart and foundation of Grice’s communication theory: the Cooperative Principle, 
shown in (4). 
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(4) Make your conversational contribution such as is required, at the stage at which it occurs, 
by the accepted purpose of direction of the talk exchange in which you are engaged. 
(Grice 1975: 45) 
The idea is that speakers and hearers are generally cooperative in speaking to one another in 
order to communicate meaning. We typically want to have our utterances understood and to 
understand others. In support of this, Grice lists four super-maxims (along with several 
submaxims) that explain the dimensions along which this cooperation should take place. These 
can be either adhered to or flouted (i.e. violated) depending on the communication act. It is 
possible to think of scenarios in which a person will not be following the Cooperative Principle 
(for example, lying or outbursts of emotion), but Grice is, for the most part, making a theory 
about the average, typical conversations that we deal with every day. 
 The first super-maxim is that of Quantity which has the following submaxims in (5): 
(5) a. Make you contribution as informative as required. 
 b. Do not make your contribution more informative than is required. (Grice 1975: 45) 
Quantity has to do with saying the appropriate amount in the given context; there is some 
flexibility in this, but in general it is considered bad form to be too wordy or too tacit (apparently 
despite the wide variety of differences amongst people). This may prove a problem for proverbs 
which are pithy in nature and carry a lot of meaning in few words. 
 Quality is the second super-maxim and it has to do with truthfulness. (6) shows its 
submaxims. 
(6) a. Do not say what you believe to be false. 
 b. Do not say that for which you lack adequate evidence. (Grice 1975: 46) 
The maxim of Quality would also apply to figurative language (which is literally false) and to 
loose speech (e.g. I’ll be there in 5 minutes). In both of these cases, the maxim of Quality is 
violated. 
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The supermaxim of Relation is underdeveloped, as admitted by Grice. While he states 
that he was wanting to work on making this maxim more robust and clear (1975: 46), he never 
did so. The submaxim is simply (7), 
(7) Be relevant (Grice 1975: 46) 
which accounts for certain odds and ends in a communication exchange that have to do with the 
context. One expects a conversation to stay on topic, for example. 
 Lastly, we come to the supermaxim of Manner. The list of its submaxims, given in (8), is 
not an exhaustive list and can be summarized with one word: clarity. 
(8) a. Avoid obscurity of expression. 
 b. Avoid ambiguity. 
 c. Be brief (avoid unnecessary prolixity). 
 d. Be orderly. (Grice 1975: 46) 
This is all well and good; we now have some guiding principles that can offer insight into how 
people communicate and how people are expected to interpret an utterance. The problem arises, 
however, in that many utterances do not follow the maxims given by Grice, especially proverbs. 
For example, proverbs may violate the maxim of Quantity by saying too little, violate the maxim 
of Quality by using a metaphor that is literally untrue, violate the maxim of Relation by 
seemingly being off-topic, and/or violate the maxim of Manner by not being clear enough in the 
context. Ramírez (2015: 13) notes that Grice will have a hard time in accounting for proverbs 
due to how often his maxims would be violated. 
This is where Grice develops the idea of flouting maxims, that is, purposefully violating 
one of his maxims or submaxims for an intended effect. The most common examples of this are 
utterances of irony and metaphor. For Grice, these utterances clearly flout Quality (truthfulness) 
because irony and metaphor are for the most part literally untrue. When a speaker intentionally 
11 
  
flouts a maxim in this way, they are still seen to be adhering to the Cooperative Principle overall 
and thus the hearer must discern why the words uttered are untrue and in turn come up with a 
satisfactory interpretation of the utterance. Some would call this approach elegant (e.g. Ludlow 
2014) whereas Wilson & Sperber (1981) argue that a simpler approach is not only possible but 
would also be clearer. One of the reasons that Grice’s maxims are necessary in his framework is 
because he takes utterances to be fully propositional and literal in their base form. 
 Through an understanding of the maxims, we can arrive at an appropriate pragmatic 
deduction of a given utterance. Consider Grice’s famous example of the interchange in (9): 
(9) A: I am out of petrol. 
 B: There is a garage around the corner. (Grice 1975: 51) 
 
Here, B’s utterance appears to be violating both Quantity (not enough information) and Relation 
(not responding directly to the issue of no petrol); the hearer can assume that B does not, in fact, 
intentionally violate these maxims. If A believes that B is cooperative, then she can interpret B’s 
utterance to be enough information for her and to be relevant, (i.e. that the garage around the 
corner is open and has petrol). This would be pragmatic inference. 
Some linguists have attempted to create a more robust theory that is still based on Grice’s 
philosophy (e.g. Levinson (1983) and Horn (1989)). These are Neo-Gricean approaches; the 
essence of Neo-Gricean approaches is that they retain Grice’s assumptions while attempting to 
improve the description of his Cooperative Principle and maxims. Post-Gricean approaches, by 
contrast, attempt to address the same problems as Grice, such as literal meaning and inference, 
but do so with a different approach and with different base assumptions. For example, Relevance 
Theory focuses on the salience of stimuli in a conversational act whereas the Cooperative 
Principle focuses on the social intentions of adhering to or flouting a linguistic moral code. It is 
to Relevance Theory that our discussion now turns. 
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2.1.2 A response to Grice 
Several years before the publication of Relevance, Wilson & Sperber’s (1981) article “On 
Grice’s theory of conversation” was an initial response to Grice. They were intrigued by Grice’s 
account despite having several fundamental questions and claiming that “it seems to us that its 
detail needs considerable modification if any further progress is to be made” (1981: 155). 
However, the broad strokes of Grice’s theory greatly influenced their work. 
While the importance of Grice’s contribution to the field is not to be underestimated, 
there was still something lacking in going forward with the theory. This is in part due to the 
foursome of maxims which are neither robust nor completely well-defined. One of Wilson & 
Sperber’s main goals was to reduce the maxims to one Principle. And so, they began with this 
definition of a communicative principle: “the speaker has done his best to be maximally 
relevant” (1981: 170). Their claim was that all of Grice’s maxims could be subsumed under this 
one. 
The problems with the maxims arise when they are contemplated more fully. To begin 
with, the maxim of Quantity is vague because it doesn’t describe the amount or type of 
information that is required in an utterance. It would mean that if there are two utterances which 
have the same propositional meaning or the same semantic meaning and one is longer, then the 
shorter of the two will be chosen. How is this amount to be measured? Syllables? Time? 
Complexity? Consider (10) from Wilson & Sperber (1981: 173). 
(10) a. Peter is married to Madeleine. 
 b. It is Peter who is married to Madeleine. 
While the propositions remain the same, (10b) is slightly longer and so, under the Cooperative 
Principle, (10a) should be uttered due to the maxim of Quantity. However, there is a reason that 
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(10b) is longer; it brings Peter into focus. We can assume that, instead of violating the maxim of 
Quantity, the speaker is being maximally relevant in the current interchange. Consider also (11). 
(11) a. The baby is eating arsenic! 
 b. The baby is putting arsenic into his mouth, chewing and swallowing it! (Ibid.) 
While (11b) might be severely odd, we would understand (through Relevance) that the only 
reason for adding extra detail in (11b) is that somehow in the context, the description of the 
activity of eating is more relevant than not saying it. Even if Grice would interpret this as 
flouting a maxim to generate an effect, it is still more succinct to hypothesize that relevance is 
the crucial factor here. The other maxims could be interpreted as following a Relevance-
Theoretic approach as well. For example, one of the sub-maxims of Manner (avoid ambiguity) is 
unnecessary because utterances will always have some amount of ambiguity – that’s the point of 
doing pragmatics in the first place. The other sub-maxim “be brief” also falls into a problem of 
how it should be measured, like Quantity above. The maxim of Relation (i.e. be relevant) speaks 
for itself. 
The other maxim that Relevance Theory can subsume is Quality. Wilson (1995) breaks 
down the approach to Grice’s maxim of Quality which is the most important within the theory 
according to Grice (Wilson 1995: 197). She asks in challenge to Grice whether or not there is 
indeed any such maxim at all. The obvious problems are with metaphor, jokes, and fiction. Grice 
does have an account for these through suspended violation (fiction) and overt violation (jokes 
and metaphor) of his maxims. Instead, Wilson asks the following question: “If figurative 
language violates a basic principle of communication, why does [figurative language] arise 
naturally, spontaneously and universally?” (1995: 201). Proverbs, likewise, are uttered without 
effort. 
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While the examples of metaphor and fiction have to be accounted for in Grice’s 
framework, there is at least an explanation for them. However, there are other examples on the 
fringes which still prove to be problematic within the Gricean framework. Wilson cites (12) 
through (14) as utterances which are neither fictional nor metaphorical yet also violate the 
maxim of Quality (1995: 204). Each of these is what Wilson would call an example of loose talk. 
(12) Holland is flat. 
(13) Jane’s face was oval. 
(14) The lecture started at 8:00. 
Each of the above utterances is not true in a strictly literal sense; in (12), the literal interpretation 
depends on the meaning of flat. It is impossible for an entire country to be perfectly flat, yet this 
utterance is not difficult to understand. There must be some adjustment of the concept FLAT in 
order to arrive at the appropriate interpretation which might be something along the lines of 
Holland is relatively flat when compared to other countries, Holland is not a mountainous 
country, etc. There are some features of countries which categorize them as flat without being 
literally flat as in a two-dimensional plane. In (13), Jane’s face is likewise not an identical 
representation of oval but more of an approximation. In addition, (14) can be seen as an 
approximation as well and can violate the maxim of Quality quite easily. If the lecture started at 
8:03, the speaker could utter (14) without much thought since it is easier to do so – a path of least 
resistance if you will. In fact, it may be seen as more relevant to utter (14) because it causes less 
processing effort for the hearer than would a more exact time. 
Wilson responds to these loose examples with the following: “instead of saying that … 
the proposition literally expressed by an utterance must be identical to a thought of the speaker’s 
… we claim that the proposition expressed must merely resemble this thought to some degree” 
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(1995: 208). In Relevance Theory, we choose the most accessible interpretation. This 
explanation also allows for loose talk such as in (12) through (14). As we will see in Chapter 4, 
proverbs also have a degree of loose talk. A good pragmatic theory needs to be able to explain 
this type of loose talk and this is a case where Grice seems to come up short. 
2.2 Summary of Relevance Theory 
This section will give an overview of Relevance Theory in order to discuss how it may be useful 
in interpreting proverbs. It should be stated that Relevance Theory is, at its core, a cognitive 
theory. Despite primarily describing pragmatic features of communication, Sperber & Wilson 
(1986/1995) reassessed one of their primary principles in a later rendition of the theory; this 
reworking allowed for the primacy of cognition. The fundamental distinction between Sperber & 
Wilson and Grice is that Relevance Theory is based in cognition and Grice’s theory is based on 
human cooperation. Sperber & Wilson latched on to Grice’s innovative ideas, however, and built 
upon them. As mentioned above, Sperber & Wilson subsume all of Grice’s supermaxims and 
submaxims under one concept: Relevance. For Sperber & Wilson, this is the most important and 
brings all aspects of inference to a head. All (successful) communication must be relevant in 
some way and hearers actively look for ways in which to interpret communication correctly. 
 This brings us to the concept of ostensive-inferential communication (Sperber & Wilson 
1986/1995: 50-54) which is largely derived from Grice’s notion of non-natural meaning. 
Ostensive-inferential communication acts are those instances of communication where it is 
obvious, apparent, or otherwise unmistakable that someone is trying to communicate with you. 
For example, if you are studying at a table with a friend and that friend gets up quietly and 
leaves, there is no ostensive communication act. You may infer that they are going to the 
washroom or getting up to grab a snack but there is no (to your knowledge) intention of 
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communication on the part of your friend. If that friend were to get up from the table and then 
wave at you, you would assume that they are communicating to you in some fashion and are 
inviting you to make an inference. This is ostensive-inferential communication: communication 
in which it is apparent that the speaker is trying to get the hearer to infer their meaning.  
 This leads to the problem that Relevance Theory is trying to solve: how do we infer 
meaning? Meaning and utterances are context-bound and the forms of language used to 
communicate are not always enough in and of themselves to get at the intended meaning of an 
utterance. There must be operations involved that help us infer such meaning. Sperber & Wilson 
propose two principles of Relevance. The first principle is called the Cognitive Principle of 
Relevance defined in (15). 
(15)  Human cognition tends to be geared to the maximisation of Relevance. 
(Sperber & Wilson 1986/1995: 260) 
 
This means that one of the major goals of the human brain is to break down perceptions of the 
world into understandable pieces that are relatable to our experience. Our mind naturally assesses 
perceptions in a way that will make sense to us. The way that “maximisation” is to be understood 
in (15) is that cognitive processes attempt to achieve adequate cognitive effects for the least 
processing effort. Cognitive effects are changes in cognition to strengthen an assumption, 
contradict an existing assumption, or derive a new, context-bound implication (Clark 2013: 102). 
A further concession here is that “adequate cognitive effects” does not mean the most cognitive 
effects, as is sometimes misunderstood in discussions and critiques of Relevance Theory. Rather, 
it is better to say, when applied to communication, that it is the intended effects that are achieved 
for the least amount of processing effort. In this sense, the intended effects are greatest when the 
communication act has been successful. An example of different kinds of cognitive effects can 
be seen in the utterances of (16) and (17). 
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(16) My childhood days are gone. 
(17) My childhood days are gone, gone. (Sperber & Wilson 1986/1995: 221) 
In (17), the addition of an extra gone indicates to the hearer that there must be extra cognitive 
effects that the speaker is trying to achieve when compared to (16). On its own, (16) has a 
relatively straightforward interpretation and relatively straightforward cognitive effects; 
however, the hearer of (17) will attempt to put together an assumption that makes that additional 
gone relevant in the utterance. The hearer will then consider it necessary to put in extra cognitive 
effort to achieve more cognitive effects. 
The second principle of Relevance is defined in (18). 
(18) Every act of ostensive communication communicates a presumption of its own optimal 
relevance. (Sperber & Wilson 1986/1995: 158) 
 
This means that when a speaker is (ostensively) attempting a communication act it will be worth 
the cognitive effort to process it and that there is an optimally relevant interpretation. When a 
proverb is uttered, for example, the hearer will interpret the utterance as best fits the current 
context and that while it may seem irrelevant on the surface, there may be a deeper meaning that 
the speaker wants to imply. 
2.3 The explicature/implicature distinction 
Relevance Theory claims that communicative utterances carry meaning through explicatures and 
implicatures, which are related to (but not the same as) what is explicit and what is implied in the 
utterance. An explicature is a proposition derived from the logical form encoded by the utterance 
(Sperber & Wilson 1986/1995: 182); implicatures, on the other hand, are premises or 
conclusions which are communicated by the utterance but which are not developments of the 
logical form of the utterance. Both can be inferred; this is a marked departure from Grice who 
proposed that explicatures are decoded from the utterance whereas implicatures are inferred 
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(Sperber & Wilson 1986/1995: 182). Sperber & Wilson hold that “the recovery of any 
assumption requires an element of inference” (Sperber & Wilson 1986/1995: 182) whether it is 
explicit or implicit. Grice prioritized keeping the literal form as the base; the literal form is what 
is communicated in an utterance and any further interpretation must be pragmatically derived 
through the maxims. The literal form is, in Grice’s terms, “what is said” whereas anything 
inferred is called an implicature. This is one way of looking at the dividing line between 
semantics and pragmatics; Figure 1 gives a simplified representation of how Grice and Sperber 
& Wilson would classify the distinction between semantics and pragmatics. Under Relevance 
Theory, both semantic and pragmatic processes are involved in arriving at explicatures and 
implicatures. “What is said” should not be relegated to only the domain of linguistic semantics. 
 
Figure 1 The semantics-pragmatics distinction (adapted from Clark 2013: 65-66) 
Under Grice (1975): 
semantics   what is said 
 
pragmatics   what is implicated 
Under Sperber & Wilson (1986/1995):  
semantics   explicature  
 
pragmatics   implicature  
 
Sperber & Wilson note that Grice’s view of implicating accounts for too much. It would mean 
that all non-explicit information is inferred (and thus implicated); sometimes, the interpretation 
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of “what is said” falls under pragmatics, instead of only semantics. An example of this would be 
the implied time reference of (19). 
(19) I’ve eaten breakfast. 
In (19), there is an implicit understanding that the speaker has eaten today, or even recently. The 
speaker probably does not intend to communicate that he has eaten breakfast some two weeks 
past or even last year or ever. Consider, by contrast, (20). 
(20) I’ve eaten frog legs. 
Depending on the culture, an utterance of (20) may be more or less common. The context I am 
thinking of is one in which this is a rarity. Given this, the time reference is understood to be any 
time in the past up to and including the speaker’s entire life. It is interpreted as a unique event 
much like I’ve been to the capital of Australia, or I’ve ridden in a limousine. For Grice, the time 
reference in (19) and (20) would be implicated, but for Sperber and Wilson it is said to be an 
explicature because it is logically inferred within the utterance. 
Relegating explicature to the analysis of Grice’s “what is said” is too restricted for 
Relevance Theory because it relies too much on the purely literal form. Instead, Relevance 
Theory’s explicatures account for any explicit information, due to the grammar, the semantics 
and the context. The term refers to the elements of the utterance which are arrived at naturally 
through both linguistic and pragmatic processes. Thus, the time referents of (19) and (20), since 
they are logically inferred, are explicatures since they are a part of the explicit meaning of the 
utterance. The key distinction with Grice is that Relevance theorists posit that pragmatic 
processes are involved in deriving meaning from both explicatures and implicatures whereas 
Grice would relegate pragmatic processes only to what is implicated. In this view, there are 
pragmatic conventions for disambiguating explicatures and no conventions for the interpretation 
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of implicature. Carston puts it succinctly in her summary of the topic: “This is emphatically not 
how the explicit/implicit distinction is drawn within the Relevance-theoretic account of utterance 
understanding, a basic difference being that pragmatic processes play an essential role on both 
sides of the distinction” (2004: 633). Carston (1988, 2000, 2004) has done much work on the 
distinction in Relevance Theory between explicatures and implicatures. 
 An example of implicatures will take us back to (17) where the repetition of gone 
provides more cognitive effects than it does alone in (16). The hearer will likely arrive at one or 
more implicatures from the utterance such as the speaker’s childhood days are long gone, the 
speaker is sad that her childhood days are gone, etc. These additional cognitive effects are the 
result of inferred communication. 
2.3.1 Strong versus weak communication 
Aside from the fact that some communicated conclusions follow more or less closely from the 
proposition that was uttered, there is also the degree of the strength of those conclusions. In the 
discussion of Relevance Theory, there are strong explicatures and weak explicatures, strong 
implicatures and weak implicatures. A strong explicature is the communicated content of the 
propositional form that is retrieved with the least amount of effort for adequate effects. 
 This discussion of strong and weak communication becomes more interesting when it 
comes to implicatures. As we have discussed, implicatures include both premises and 
conclusions derived from an utterance that are not entailed by the propositional form of the 
utterance. However, in many cases, there are multiple implicatures that can be communicated 
through one utterance. Some of these implicatures are more strongly communicated than others. 
For example consider the difference between (21) and (22). 
(21) Would you like a coffee? 
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(22) Would you like to go for coffee? 
The content of (21) has strong implicatures; there are many strong and reasonable implicatures of 
this utterance within North American culture. Some of these may include the list in (23). 
(23) a. Would you like a coffee, or another hot beverage? 
 
b. I will serve you the drink if you say yes. 
 
c. I will go and get you the drink if you say yes. 
 
On the other hand, while (22) may seem like a straightforward utterance, there are many possible 
weaker implicatures which can arise, especially within different contexts. Weaker implicatures 
are propositions which are often up for interpretation and not as obviously intentionally 
communicated. Forms of weak communication could include those in (24). 
(24) a. I would like to get to know you better. 
 
b. Let’s talk. 
 
c. We will engage in conversation while we are out. 
 
d. I am interested in you. 
 
Remember, the explicature is not only derived from the logical form but also from the context of 
the utterance. A likely strong explicature of (22) may be Would you like to go out for a (non-
alcoholic) drink? or even Would you like to go for a (non-alcoholic) beverage at a public 
location primarily known for serving coffee? It is interesting to note that in (22) the meaning of 
coffee has expanded, especially when compared to the meaning of coffee in (21). While it is 
implicated that coffee will extend beyond the concept of COFFEE to BEVERAGE, it is usually also 
clear that it will stay out of the realm of ALCOHOLIC BEVERAGE. 
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2.3.2 Metaphor and Relevance Theory 
In Relevance Theory terms, the more creative an utterance is, the more implicatures are likely to 
be drawn from it and the more interpretation is required. When it comes to metaphor, the theory 
states that a metaphor gives rise to many weak implicatures instead of fewer strong ones. An 
example of this would be poetry, where there is a lot of information derived from a single line, 
some of it more strongly communicated than others. That is, the conclusions drawn from more 
figurative language will be less certain and more open to meaning modulation, especially when 
there are a dozen competing weak implicatures. Strong implicatures would arise from an 
overused or dead metaphor, before it becomes a part of the lexicon, at which point it would 
become an explicature (Vega-Moreno 2003). I will be arguing that most proverbs exhibit one 
strong implicature with many weaker ones. 
Relevance Theory has changed and developed its treatment of metaphor over the years. 
While it has always rejected the traditional view on the dichotomy of literal versus non-literal 
utterances (see, e.g., Sperber & Wilson 2008), it has become more flexible in its understanding 
of figurative language. There is not an obvious division of literal and non-literal; they are on a 
continuum. Furthermore, it is recognized by some (e.g. Gibbs 2001) that non-literal or figurative 
interpretations of utterances are sometimes processed more quickly than the more literal 
interpretation of the utterance. One of Relevance Theory’s main tenets which sets it apart from 
more traditional approaches is that it does not assume that more literal utterances are different in 
kind to metaphorical utterances. This assumption has allowed Relevance Theory to explain 
processes that underlie all communication regardless of its propositional form. This will be a 
boon when it comes to an analysis of proverbs which can vary greatly between their semantics 
and their pragmatic interpretation. 
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Another advantage within Relevance Theory is that the processing of possible 
interpretations of an utterance occurs in parallel and not in sequence. That is, the brain will arrive 
at an interpretation often without even considering the literal meaning of the utterance, as is the 
case with idioms, proverbs, and many uses of metaphor. On this point, Tendahl & Gibbs (2008) 
offer the following insight on their summary of Relevance Theory: “listeners will never assume 
that the speaker’s utterance is literal, they will only assume that it is optimally relevant. In order 
to achieve optimal Relevance, we are often forced to speak loosely and therefore hearers do not 
expect us to talk literally” (2008: 1834). This discussion of Relevance Theory and metaphor will 
continue in Chapter 4. 
2.4 Summary 
In a search for an adequate pragmatic theory to handle the analysis of proverbs, theories such as 
Grice’s may fall short due to their focus on the literal proposition as the base form of an 
utterance. Relevance Theory rejects the traditional view and allows for the on-line processing of 
figurative language in parallel with and sometimes more quickly than the literal. The assumption 
is that figurative language is not deviant from a literal norm. Proverbs, of course, are often 
metaphoric and so may fall into this analysis as a type of speech that results in weaker 
implicatures; we will see if that is the case. An additional dimension of the proverb, however, is 
the inclination, in some cultures, to offer a proverb in a way that results in multiple 
interpretations, each for a different hearer. Chapter 4 will have detailed examples of explicatures 
and implicatures derived from proverbs. Before we get there, the following chapter gives us our 
introduction to proverbs. 
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3. Proverbs 
The study of proverbs is paremiology, a wide-ranging field which varies from discussions of 
proverb constituent structure to the role of proverbs in the sociocultural realm of a given society. 
There has been a steady stream of research on the proverb which is largely indebted to Mieder 
(e.g. 1994; cf. Mieder & Dundes 1994) who has compiled key works into several edited volumes 
as well as editing the annually published Proverbium since 1985. Related to paremiology, the 
field of paremiography is the collection of proverbs; there are many, many compendiums of 
proverbs in hundreds of languages. While proverb collections are useful, these documents do not 
typically offer an analysis of the proverbs or even annotations of the meanings of the proverbs 
within the culture’s context (Mieder 1997). Yankah refers to this as proverbs being “isolated and 
frozen on paper by the scholar” (1984: 5). Mieder has worked to increase the amount of analysis 
rather than focus on butterfly collecting, and this thesis attempts to offer some pragmatic 
linguistic analysis to add to the discussion. Despite the amount of content available, there have 
been few studies of proverbs that mention Relevance Theory (Ku-Mesu 1996, Wilson 2009, Soi 
2014, Ramírez 2015, Pegulescu 2016, Abang Muhi 2018, and El-Bahy 2019) and fewer still 
which apply the theory with a deeper analysis (of these, Soi (2014) bears mentioning). 
 This chapter begins with a description and definition of the proverb (3.1) with Section 3.2 
showcasing some important structural aspects and terminology of the proverb. The following 
section (3.3) will explore the importance of context before summarizing the work that has been 
done in or is related to pragmatics in Section 3.4. The last section of this chapter (3.4.1) will 
delve deeper into the analogic nature of proverbs and discuss how this can be further analyzed 
with Relevance Theory. 
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3.1 Definition of the proverb 
It has been widely claimed that proverbs are impossible to define; here enters the famous and oft-
quoted remark by Taylor who stated that “the definition of a proverb is too difficult to repay the 
undertaking” (1931: 3). In addition to the difficulties in coming up with a definition, there are 
also the widespread contributions that are consistently made to the study of proverbs from a 
multitude of fields. Each discipline has its own views and goals which can make a cross-
discipline definition difficult. For example, psychologists seem more interested in the figurative 
aspect of proverbs for screening out certain disorders that make it difficult to determine 
metaphoric meaning (e.g. Mieder 1978, Van Lancker 1990). Folklorists and historians focus on 
proverbs’ origins in antiquity, and anthropologists focus on proverbs’ capacity to represent the 
social mind of a culture. To make deciding on a definition even more difficult, definitions of 
proverbs can vary depending on the culture. Aasland (2012: 14; cf. 25-26) notes that an 
interdisciplinary approach is best. 
 Despite these challenges, and Taylor’s (1931) prevalent statement, some authors have 
made it clear that it is, in fact, possible to draw some boundaries on what the meaning of the term 
“proverb” actually is. We will make an attempt here to justify the bounds within which a proverb 
should reside. 
Perhaps the most common definition, at least informally, has been ascribed to Lord John 
Russell and has changed through use to “the wisdom of many and the wit of one” (Taylor 
1962: 3; repeated from the introduction). It requires someone to utter the right proverb in the 
right context at the right time. Another definition of the proverb comes from Seitel (1969: 124) 
who states that proverbs are “short, traditional, ‘out-of-context’ statements used to further some 
social end.” But perhaps the most recognized description of the proverb comes from Mieder: “a 
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proverb is a short, generally known sentence of the folk which contains wisdom, truth, morals, 
and traditional views in a metaphorical, fixed and memorizable form and which is handed down 
from generation to generation” (1985: 119). 
When it comes to analyzing proverbs, Norrick (1985: 31-79, 2014) offers a 
comprehensive summary of how proverbs have been described, and looks at how they overlap 
with or are distinct from related expressions of language use such as aphorisms, maxims, slogans 
and more. Norrick’s work captures the essence of the proverb with several well-chosen 
adjectives, similar to Mieder (1985): “proverbs are traditional, pithy, often formulaic and/or 
figurative, fairly stable and generally recognizable units” (Norrick 2014: 7). There is some 
flexibility with each of these descriptors, but this will do for now. Examples from English can be 
seen in (25) through (29), each of them fitting Norrick’s description. Several of these are so 
ingrained in the culture that it may be surprising to think of them as proverbs of Western culture 
at all. 
(25)   Money talks. 
(26)   A picture is worth a thousand words. 
(27)   Look before you leap. 
(28)   Many cooks spoil the broth. 
(29)   The more, the merrier. 
These few examples coincide with Norrick’s definition; they are metaphoric, stable, and pithy. In 
addition, they appear to offer a truth that is undeniable within the given culture (despite the 
paradoxical fact that many proverbs appear to contradict with one another, such as (28) and 
(29)). The generic truth behind any proverb is often a culturally assumed truth that is taken for 
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granted, such as money talks. This cultural truth fits into the part of the description that calls 
them “traditional”.  
While proverbs are typically fixed forms, there is another characteristic which Norrick 
identifies as being essential to the proverb: they make a full conversational contribution on their 
own. That is, they are complete grammatical units that don’t require additional arguments, 
syntax, or morphology to make a complete sentence. As Norrick states, they are “syntactically 
independent of their context” (1985: 30). 
We have begun our discussion with what a proverb is (or at least its characteristics). In 
order to refine our definition of the proverb, I will now delineate what a proverb is not. At this 
point a comparison to similar linguistic forms will help in justifying this definition. Norrick 
(1985, 2014) goes on to compare the proverb to several other fixed forms in order to make his 
definition a little tighter. The types of fixed forms that the proverb is related to are what Norrick 
calls the proverbial phrase (to kick over the traces) and the proverbial comparison (as old as the 
hills; 2014: 8). 
These are typically akin to idiomatic expressions (see discussion in 4.2); the major point 
of departure here from the proverb is that the proverbial phrase and the proverbial comparison 
cannot stand on their own as an utterance. They do not make a conversational contribution on 
their own. Additional elements are required such as the insertion of a noun phrase which would 
lead to the need to change the form for some idioms to account for verb agreement. 
In addition to proverbial phrase, there are also slogans (Just do it; Yes we can) which are 
pithy and stable statements yet are not traditional; it is possible, however, that some advertising 
campaigns could result in a proverb being added to the culture over time. Lastly, we have winged 
words (I have a dream) and aphorisms (art is long, life is short), both of which rely on citation 
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rather than shared cultural knowledge (Martin Luther King Jr. for the former and Hippocrates for 
the latter). Winged words belong to historical figures and aphorisms belong to literature and so 
there can be at times an overlapping of the two. For a more comprehensive discussion of these 
comparisons, see Norrick (1985: 73). 
On comparing proverbs with other types of utterances, Cram (1983) offers an interesting 
insight into how the proverb, with its cultural truth, differs from a similar statement that appears 
to offer a generic truth. Cram asks us to consider and compare the sentences in (30) and (31). 
(30) Nicotine makes the heart beat faster. 
(31) Absence makes the heart grow fonder. (Cram 1983: 74) 
He states that mother tongue speakers will notice an immediate difference between the two 
statements: (30) is a fact whereas (31) is a proverb (1983: 74). The latter of these examples has 
several of Norrick’s characteristics listed for proverbs: oft-used, traditional and stable. The 
stability of the proverb can be noticed more abruptly when the constituents are rearranged. 
Rearranging the constituents of (30) is possible whereas for (31) it is not, or it is at least less 
likely. Compare (32) and (33). 
(32) The heart beats faster because of nicotine. 
(33) ?The heart grows fonder because of absence. 
The distinction that Cram argues for is that proverbs are stored in the lexicon as whole, 
independent units, which adds to the general consensus that proverbs are stable forms. The 
stability of a form likely comes through repetition of the proverb over time leading to the view 
that it is also traditional.   
There are other multi-constituent forms that are also stable or fixed, such as the idiom. 
While idioms may not always be as fixed as we think (Vega-Moreno 2003), they are still 
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relatively stable forms within a language. This comparison between proverbs and idioms will be 
further explored in 4.2. 
3.2 Some proverb types and terminology 
A recurring and ubiquitous stylistic feature of the proverb is the use of parallelisms 
(Mac Coinnigh 2014: 122-128). Two lexemes, clauses, or sentences are compared or contrasted; 
this is evidenced both syntactically and semantically where particular structural features denote 
that a comparison is being made. There are several ways of creating parallelisms, as described by 
Mac Coinnigh, and depending on the context and meaning of the proverb, the parallelism will 
result in a different interpretation. That is, the general relationship between each half of the 
proverb will differ depending on the proverb. 
 The major distinction is between two different types of coordination: syndetic and 
asyndetic. These types of coordination have to do with how the first half and latter half of the 
proverb are related grammatically. Syndetic coordinations have an explicit conjunction within 
the proverb, such as is bolded in (34; Spanish). 
(34) El muerto a la tumba y el vivo a la rumba 
 The dead to the tomb and the living to the rumba [i.e. dance] 
 (Mac Coinnigh 2014: 122) 
 
Parallelisms as in (34) often have mirrored or analogic syntax where the structure of the first 
element is replicated or partially replicated in the second. In (34), we have a noun phrase 
followed by a prepositional phrase, with the same prepositions (a ‘to’) and the same determiners 
(el and la ‘the’) mirrored in each clause. Additionally, we have a rhyming pair of nouns tumba 
and rumba. 
Asyndetic coordinations involve a parallel construction in which the conjunction is 
absent. Crystal’s (2008: 470) dictionary notes that this type of expression is often used for 
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“economical or dramatic” effect. These proverbs are often aided by the use of mirrored syntax 
which helps create the connection between the clauses. Rhyming, alliteration, and other poetic 
features often help with this as well. This is shown in (35) and (36). 
(35) Nemico diviso, mezzo vino. (Italian) 
 Enemy divided, half won. (Mac Coinnigh 2014: 123) 
 
(36) Andere Länder, andere Sitten. (German) 
 Other countries, other customs. (Ibid.) 
 
Asyndetic coordination brings us to the discussion of one of the most ubiquitous forms of the 
proverb: parataxis. Parataxis is a structural device, like asyndetic coordination, which omits the 
use of coordinating conjunctions. However, it is a special type of coordination in which the link 
is defined primarily by the juxtaposition of elements (Crystal 2008) rather than the omission of a 
conjunction. This juxtaposition is often expressed with punctuation (in writing) or intonation (in 
speech, typically a pause). In many languages, there is overlap between asyndetic coordination 
and parataxis; the proverbs in (35) and (36), for example, could also be categorized as using 
parataxis. However, Cameroon Pidgin English (CPE) is an example of a language that has 
proverbs of both types. There is an intriguing contrast in the types of asyndetic coordination and 
parataxis that appear in CPE. The first type is shown in (37) and (38). 
(37) chop  foget tomoro 
 Eat, forget tomorrow. (Someone who eats today and forgets the following day.) 
(Kouega 2017: 10) 
 
(38) ova sabi kari basket [sic.] 
 Over know, carry basket. (He who pretends to know everything is easily duped.) (Ibid.) 
These examples have what Kouega calls an “implicit” coordinator. There is no pause in the 
pronunciation of the CPE like there would be after the comma in the English gloss. Since (37) 
and (38) are defined by the omission of the conjunction, these are a clear example of asyndetic 
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coordination. By contrast, there are several proverbs in CPE which do include a pause. A sample 
of these is shown in (39) and (40). 
(39) giv ashia, kari kenja 
Give sympathy, carry basket. (You have come only to help him but now you are doing 
the whole job.) (Kouega 2017: 10) 
(40) man pas yu, kari yi bak 
 Man surpass you, carry his back. (If you can’t beat someone, join him.) (Ibid.) 
These examples include the orthographic convention of a comma to indicate the pause in speech. 
Since (39) and (40) are categorized by their intonation and focus on juxtaposition, they clearly 
fall within the definition of parataxis (as per Crystal (2008)). 
The classic example of parataxis in English is shown in (41) where each clause is 
successively juxtaposed. These clauses are juxtaposed in order to show a sequence of events, 
omitting the use of conjunctions. 
(41)   I came, I saw, I conquered. 
One feature that separates parataxis from asyndetic coordination is that some parallelisms 
using parataxis are semantically motivated based on the structure. Like in (41) where it is 
apparent that the clauses represent a temporal sequence, the relationship and nature of 
juxtaposition is clear within the context of a proverb. This kind of interpretation would fall under 
the explicature within Relevance Theory; there are semantic cues which point to the appropriate 
interpretation. Mac Coinnigh (2014: 128-129) lists three major types of paratactic constructions 
in proverbs: equating, cause and effect, and contrast and antonymy. An example of each of these 
will be given in turn. 
  The following type of parataxis is the comparison of two elements that are seen as 
equivalent. Consider (42). 
(42) First come, first served. 
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There is no intent to show contrast between the first and second clauses; they are equal. 
 Secondly, two elements may be juxtaposed for the purpose of showing cause and effect. 
This is shown in (43) and (44) where the first clause is seen to either precede or be the cause of 
the second. Again, the interpretation of “cause and effect” would be an example of explicature. 
(43) No pain, no gain. 
(44) Full cup, steady hand. 
 Last are examples of contrast. In (45) argent ‘pay’ is contrasted with besogne ‘work’ 
such that the two elements cannot be equal as in (42) but indicate an antonymic relationship. 
This is the nature of parataxis; the environment of the clause dictates the relationship. 
(45) Selon l’argent, la besogne. (French) 
 What pay, such work. (Mac Coinnigh 2014: 129) 
 
Again, there are no identifiable syntactic coordinators to combine the two clauses or even to 
designate the relationship. The relationship is largely predicted by the semantics of the proverb 
as well as its understanding through use and reuse. The following section will discuss how we 
determine the meaning of proverbs by exploring the importance of context. 
3.3 The importance of context 
Of course, all communication happens at a specific time, in a specific place, and between 
specific people. All of these factors will influence to a lesser or greater degree the interpretation 
of utterances. As noted above, however, many proverb collections are typically lists of isolated 
utterances, absent of context; while the meaning can still be clear in these compendiums, the 
range of their possible uses may not be (as per Ku-Mesu 1996; e.g. see Section 1, this paper). As 
Wilson has stated, “context alone can change the message” (2009: 45) and this could not be more 
true for proverbs. In the examples in this chapter so far, the isolated utterances of proverbs were 
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useful in determining some terminology for proverbs without context. One aim of this thesis, 
though, is to describe how context influences the use and understanding of proverbs. 
 We must first begin with the base meaning. The base meaning of the proverb is 
essentially a non-figurative paraphrase of the proverb when removed from context, as per 
Andersson (2013) and Aasland (2012, 2014), what Norrick (1985) calls the “standard proverbial 
interpretation”. Aasland (2012) makes the point that cultural information is necessary to find the 
base meaning of the proverb which is supported by Ku-Mesu’s (1996) study and Soi (2014: 108). 
While no utterance is entirely context-free, what is meant by the base meaning is the stable, 
general truth of the proverb understood by the language community. This common, shared 
meaning is the “wisdom of many”. I will be arguing in Chapter 4 that this meaning is largely the 
explicature of the proverb and shares some qualities with idioms. Proverbs, of course, typically 
have a deeper meaning than idioms, and this meaning comes to the surface when the proverb is 
applied to a specific context. For example, consider the common English proverb in (46). 
(46) You can’t teach an old dog new tricks. 
One might say that the base meaning of this proverb is that it is difficult for an older person (or 
animal) to learn something new. When considering cases in which this may or may not be true, 
however, the discussion must revolve around specific cases in a specific context. For (46), the 
situation could be a long-term employee learning a new machine at the workplace. This is where 
another meaning begins to surface, when the proverb, by analogy, is applied to certain referents 
in the real world. I will be arguing that this emergent meaning is the implicature. The work of 
Domínguez Barajas (2010) has done much to show how context contributes to the emergent 
meaning of proverbs: 
“Proverbs are seen, instead, as communicative tools that contribute to the desired goal of 
people engaged in communication, but these tools – despite the unchanging aspect of 
their surface forms – are remarkably multifunctional because it is not their form but the 
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social context and adaptive human reasoning that invest them with meaning.” 
(Domínguez Barajas 2010: 17) 
 
Other scholars have also focused on the context of proverbs in their analyses. Arewa & Dundes 
(1964), for example, call for the elicitation and explanation of context when recording proverbs; 
their well-documented examples of Yoruba proverbs in their paper reflect that desire with much 
explanation of context (1964: 71-73). Their comment on the field of folklore is insightful 
(though dated) in which they state that many collections focus on “the lore rather than upon the 
folk” (1964: 70), i.e. on form rather than context. Penfield & Duru (1988) also note the role of 
context as an essential feature in how children grow and develop in their understanding of 
proverbs with data from Igbo (Niger-Congo): “[Children] must understand the similarity or 
analogy between the literal meaning and the interactional context” (1988: 122). What Penfield & 
Duru also notice is how proverbs retain their base meaning while still providing different, 
emergent meanings in different contexts; this facet of proverb use is another point that children 
must grasp in order to speak well: “they must also learn that the same proverb can have very 
different contextual meanings and illocutionary acts yet maintain the same deep philosophical 
meaning” (1988: 122). While proverbs may play a much larger role in Igbo than in English, the 
general principle is the same: one base meaning, different contextual meanings. 
There appears to be a conflict, then, when two or more proverbs in a given language 
contradict each other, called counter proverbs. Yankah (1984) discusses the apparent 
contradictory nature of proverbs in all cultures. For example, the proverb absence makes the 
heart grow fonder and out of sight, out of mind appear on the surface to have a contradictory 
meaning despite the fact that the proverbs are seen as traditional and cultural truths of the 
society. There are countless pairs of antithetical proverbs in many languages. Yankah’s argument 
is that the context of the utterance eliminates the contradiction. For example, one may utter the 
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proverb absence makes the heart grow fonder to someone who is experiencing heartache after a 
loved one has made a long journey. To someone who has an alleged loved one but appears not to 
be missing them at all, one might say out of sight, out of mind. To Yankah, the underlying truth 
of the proverb does not change but the context makes it clear which truth should be expressed. 
Either of the above proverbs can be uttered truthfully if it is in the correct context, which is why 
Kirshenblatt-Gimblett argues that proverbs “express relative rather than absolute truth” (1973: 
115). Relevance Theory is well-equipped to explain counter proverbs because of the presumption 
of optimal relevance: a hearer will search for the relevance of a particular utterance of a proverb 
regardless of whether or not it may appear to contradict another proverb in the language. Within 
Relevance Theory, cognitive effects will be processed based on the context of the utterance in 
order to determine meaning. 
Yankah (1984) notes that most scholars in the past have dealt with the “concept” or base 
meaning when attempting to explain antithetical proverb pairs but Yankah states that it becomes 
easier to see how these disparate proverbs can co-exist once we look at context. In view of 
explaining counter proverbs, no other article at that point had done so while referring to context 
(1984: 4). For Yankah, it is in the moment of uttering the proverb that “contradiction becomes 
irrelevant” (1984: 7). 
To further explore the interaction between the context and the utterance of the proverb, 
the following section will discuss some ideas from paremiology which explore potential 
pragmatic solutions to how we understand proverbs in context. 
3.4 Earlier and current ideas on pragmatics 
There appears to be a lack in the literature of a unified pragmatic theory on the use of proverbs, 
although several authors have brought this discussion to bear in specific contexts (see Seitel 
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1969, Lieber 1984, Yankah 1984, Penfield & Duru 1988, Krikmann 1974, Arewa & Dundes 
1964, Jesenšek 2014, Grzybek 2014, et al.). These authors begin with the importance of context 
as a key aspect of their analysis. 
 One of the earlier scholars who began developing a theory of proverb meaning is 
Kirshenblatt-Gimblett (1973); she proposed a specific equation for determining the meaning of a 
proverb in context. Her hypothesis reads like this: proverb meaning is equal to the participants’ 
evaluation of the situation plus participants’ understanding of the proverb’s base plus the 
interactional strategy of the proverb user (1973: 119). Throughout her article, “proverb meaning” 
is the meaning (intended to be) communicated by a specific utterance of a proverb. We can take 
“the participants’ evaluation of the situation” as the current context. If we do so, this equation put 
more simply might read something like (47). 
(47) Proverb meaning = context + base meaning + speaker’s intention 
Or, in Relevance Theory terms it may read like something closer to (48), if we allow the “base 
meaning” to be an explicature and the “strategy” of Kirshenblatt-Gimblett’s equation to be the 
intended emergent meaning of the proverb when applied to the situation. 
(48) Proverb meaning = context + 1 explicature + implicature(s)/explicature(s) (pragmatically 
derived from the speaker’s intent.) 
 
Kirshenblatt-Gimblett’s theory works well within the current thesis because it shows the multiple 
factors that contribute to the interpretation of the utterance of a proverb. The proverb contains a 
“wisdom of many”, or explicature, which requires knowledge of the proverb by speakers of the 
language. It theorizes that there will always be an explicature in any given proverb utterance that 
equates to the traditional meaning of the proverb. Then, there are additional implicatures that 
arise due to the analogy between the explicature of the proverb and a situation in the current 
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context. Table 1 at the end of the following section shows a comparison of this theory to others 
that will be discussed. 
 Analogy is an essential part of proverb interpretation. Each time a proverb is uttered, 
there are referents in the real world to which elements of the proverb apply. For example, in the 
proverb too many cooks spoil the broth, the cooks may refer to (by analogy) a group of at least 
two people and the broth to the project/effort that the group is devoted to. The application of this 
analogy is essential in determining the strong implicature characterized by the utterance which 
will be specific to the context. Both Seitel (1969) and Lieber (1984) have discussed the 
importance of analogy in their work and a summary and evaluation of each follows. 
3.4.1 Exploring analogies in proverbs 
Of all the discussions concerning the pragmatics of proverbs, Seitel’s (1969) is perhaps the most 
cited. Seitel presents a model of proverb understanding which is brief but has had a profound 
impact on the scholarship that followed. His paper leans towards a pragmatic interpretation of 
proverbs and presents some similarities to ideas presented in Relevance Theory. To begin with, 
Seitel breaks down the analogic components of a proverb utterance into two categories: that 
which belongs to the form itself and that which belongs to the context. 
Seitel’s model includes X:Y where X is the speaker and Y is the hearer. This relationship 
represents the social context of the exchange and the dynamics between the speaker and hearer in 
regards to their age, gender, social status and more. We will leave the X:Y relationship aside for 
now. The main focus of Seitel is the relationship between the form of the proverb and the 
application of that form to the current situation. For Seitel, each proverb contains a relationship 
between two elements, typically represented in the former and latter portions of a proverb. For 
example first come and first served would be considered two elements represented by A and B 
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respectively. According to Seitel, a proverb is of form A:B which is likened to a pair C:D in the 
situation; there is a relationship between the utterance of first come, first served (A:B) and the 
real world referents in context (C:D; i.e. the referent of first come (C) and the referent of first 
served (D)). Any given proverb will have plenty of ways to relate to different contexts. There are 
many ways the correlations of A:B :: C:D can be drawn, which will be shown in the discussion 
of Lieber (1984) who expanded upon Seitel’s original model. 
The relationship between the two elements of a proverb is in part determined by their 
juxtaposition. Seitel notes how this juxtaposition can lead to relevant cognitive effects of an 
utterance in context: “when two terms appear in juxtaposition within the proverb situation, the 
sets of features characteristic of each combine so that features which correspond between the 
terms make up the relationship ~ while others, for which there is no correspondence between the 
terms, drop out” (1969: 136). For example, Seitel gives the Ibo (Eastern Nigeria) proverb if one 
finger brought oil it soiled the others (1969: 128). In this proverb, the one finger (A) has a 
relationship with the other fingers (B) which is that of soiling. The juxtaposition of A and B in 
this proverb brings about the salience (or relevance) of the proximity of the fingers on the hand 
which helps in determining the meaning of the proverb. 
Lieber (1984) discusses the nature of analogy and that the nature of an analogic 
relationship can differ depending on the context. For example, the relationship between black 
and white could be one of opposites and by analogy be similar to the relationship between hot 
and cold. Alternatively, it could also relate to different types in a category colour and thus relate, 
by analogy, to apple and pear (1984: 105) which could be seen as different types in the category 
fruit. The relationship between the two elements black and white is ambiguous until the analogic 
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counterpart is revealed; Lieber argues that the same process applies to proverbs. He calls this 
“analogic ambiguity”. 
Any relationship between A and B in a proverb could alter depending on the context. The 
ambiguity of a comparison A:B, in relation to another comparison C:D, is ambiguous such that 
the exact relation between A:B is ambiguous until its metonymic counterpart C:D is revealed. In 
our example above, black would be A, white would be B, and the relationship between them 
(whether it be opposites, points on a spectrum, etc.) would not be determined until another pair 
C:D is discussed. Lieber presents the paradox that despite proverbs’ inherent ambiguity, their 
purpose is often to disambiguate a context. A complex scenario can be made clear by a didactic 
turn of phrase, especially once the situation has been categorized by its relationship to a proverb. 
What Lieber calls analogic ambiguity could be solved by Relevance Theory’s ad hoc concept 
formation (see Section 4.3), where concepts are broadened or narrowed in specific contexts. In 
these situations, the context clarifies the meanings of concepts for the purposes of the 
communication exchange. 
Contributing to the discussion of models of proverb interpretation, Penfield & Duru 
(1988) comment on Seitel’s (1969) approach to solving the understanding of proverbs and note 
something missing. They argue that Seitel’s model does not account for what they call the 
“philosophical” meaning of the proverb, what I am calling the base meaning, or explicature. This 
absence of the base meaning is also noted by Grzybek (1989: 361, 2014). In Seitel’s model, there 
is only the utterance (A:B) and the contextual application (C:D); it does not include the 
traditional meaning. Penfield & Duru state that Seitel’s argument “does not allow for a 
philosophical meaning nor does it provide an explanation for the reason why [A:B] may remain 
the same and [C:D] may contain very different elements yet still hold the same philosophical 
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meaning” (1988: 123). That is, Seitel does not explain how one proverb’s form may account for 
very different referents in context while the proverb form nearly always refers to the same basic 
(philosophical) meaning. I am more inclined to agree with this approach as there appear to be 
three major elements present in proverb interpretation (context, explicature, and implicature). 
This contrast is noted in Table 1 below. Penfield & Duru make a welcome critique to Seitel, one 
that fits well with the hypothesis presented in this thesis. The following Table gives a 
comparison of some of the pragmatic theories discussed, showing the components of proverb 
meaning under each theory. The first column puts Russell’s famous quote into comparison with 
the theoretical approach of the other authors. 
Table 1 Comparison of proverb theories 
Russell 
(c. 1763) 
Seitel 
(1969) 
Penfield & Duru 
(1988) 
Kirshenblatt-Gimblett 
(1973) 
Toews 
(Current thesis) 
- A : B Literal Proverb performance Utterance 
- - - Participant’s evaluation of 
the situation 
Context 
Wit of one C : D Contextual Interactional strategy of 
proverb user 
Implicature(s) 
Wisdom of 
many 
(not accounted 
for) 
Philosophical Base meaning Base meaning 
(explicature) 
 
3.4.2 Cognitive approaches 
In a more recent Cognitive approach, Aasland (2012, 2014) has been arguing for the use of 
Blending Theory (Fauconnier & Turner 1998) for proverb interpretation. In Blending Theory, 
mental spaces are conceptual packets of information in the brain. Information from different but 
related mental spaces will combine to make a new mental space called the blend. While Blending 
Theory operates under different base assumptions than Relevance Theory (e.g. it is an 
associationist account rather than an inferential account), it also assumes more working parts for 
the interpretation of proverbs than will Relevance Theory. There are at least four mental spaces 
in each proverb interpretation (two inputs, a generic space, and a proto-blend) in addition to 
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external factors such as the setting (à la Sietel’s (1969) X and Y) and a “common cultural 
understanding” (Aasland 2012, 2014). 
Aasland posits Sperber & Wilson’s (1986/1995) relevance as a key element in his theory 
and he in fact replaces the “common cultural understanding” with relevance in his model 
(Aasland 2012: 115). He determines that this is the piece that is needed to make his theory 
complete: “the proverb by itself … lack[s] the cultural inferences which [have] been termed 
relevance’ … Culture, then, completes the meaning of the proverb both as base meaning and as 
blended meaning” (Aasland 2012: 137). Relevance is the connection between the context of the 
utterance and the base meaning of the proverb used. Aasland sees relevance as what connects the 
assumption and the context; this is more of an external factor (similar to Soi 2014) and not a part 
of the mental spaces of the blend. 
Other Cognitive approaches include Honeck (1997) and Honeck & Temple (1994) with a 
critique by Gibbs, Colston, & Johnson (1996). However, the realm of Cognitive Linguistics goes 
beyond the scope of the present thesis. 
3.5 Summary 
This chapter began with describing several characteristics of the proverb, namely that they are 
traditional, pithy, and stable over time. The parallel structure of proverbs is ubiquitous and it 
results in a relationship being drawn between the first half of a proverb and the latter half. 
Parataxis is an important notion which shows that the nature of this relationship can differ 
depending on the proverb. 
 Several scholars have made steps towards a theory of proverb meaning (e.g. Seitel 1969 
and Kirshenblatt-Gimblett 1973). Drawing a comparison between several of the approaches 
described above, Table 1 offered a summary of how each theory compares on different aspects of 
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proverb interpretation; Seitel (1969) does not have the base meaning as part of his model and 
each perspective presented gives context an important role in the interpretation of proverbs. I 
will bring all these aspects together in the following chapter in which I present a detailed 
overview of how Relevance Theory may account for proverb meaning through explicatures, 
implicatures, and ad hoc concept formation. 
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4. Applying Relevance Theory to proverbs 
The preceding chapters have laid the foundation for the approach of the current thesis. Relevance 
Theory is robust enough to account for the pragmatics of proverb use. Proverbs have been 
characterized as pithy, traditional, and stable units of speech which have an analogic application 
to a situation in the current context. Proverbs tend to have some amount of underdetermined 
meaning; how will a particular proverb will be applied and understood in a particular situation? 
This will be the focus of the current chapter. 
Yankah summarizes well one of the core aspects of this discussion: “the isolated proverb 
concept may be viewed as having a constellation of potential meanings, each of which 
crystallizes in contextual usage” (1984: 8-9). A proverb has many applications, which is one of 
the reasons a given proverb can remain in a language over generations. The potential meanings 
that Yankah refers to are the potential implicatures that may arise in context, an idea that will be 
developed as we explore the data. 
Section 1.1 included the reasoning behind the types of examples and data that are present 
in this chapter. To begin with, each section will have proverbs which should be easily 
recognizable to native English speakers; this will increase the ease in identifying the appropriate 
explicatures of each proverb. Later on in this chapter, I will apply my hypothesis to data from 
other languages. 
This chapter will begin with an overview of the application of Relevance Theory to 
proverbs in Section 4.1. This overview will introduce the three main concepts essential to this 
thesis: idioms, metaphor, and ad hoc concept formation. The following three sections will 
address each of these in further detail (idioms in 4.2, metaphor in 4.3, and ad hoc concept 
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formation in 4.4). Several examples from other languages will be included in 4.5 before the 
summary of the chapter in 4.6. 
4.1 Overview of the hypothesis 
The majority of the proverbs that I will be discussing in this chapter will be conventional and 
more well-known proverbs. Abang Muhi, in his study of nearly 1,400 Sarawak Malay 
(Austronesian) proverbs, notes that 70 per cent are proverbs which are “established by usage and 
not immediately comprehensible from the words used” (2018: 3). The reason for this is that one 
of the main characteristics of a proverb is that they are traditional (see Section 3.1), meaning that 
the language community as a whole will typically recognize them in speech. There are definitely 
cases of lesser known proverbs, proverbs that have fallen out of favor and the like; new proverbs 
may also arise over time (e.g. a picture is worth a thousand words). However, most proverbs in 
this discussion should typically be tacit knowledge to native speakers of a language and thus 
many of these examples to begin with are in English. Recall from Chapter 1 that Ku-Mesu 
(1996) and Aasland (2012) noticed the importance of cultural knowledge in the appropriate 
interpretation of proverbs. For proverbs in other languages, I will rely on examples of proverbs 
with sufficient context. 
The line of reasoning for interpreting proverbs is as follows. When a proverb is uttered, 
the surface meaning of the utterance typically appears unrelated to the situation or conversation 
at hand. However, due to the presumption of optimal relevance, the intended meaning of the 
proverb is not lost on the hearer. In fact, since the form is conventional, similar to an idiom (see 
4.2), the appropriate meaning is likely to be readily apparent as an explicature to the hearer. That 
is, an utterance of a proverb will lead to an explicature, which is that proverb’s base meaning. 
Consider the proverb in (49). 
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(49)  Don’t judge a book by its cover. 
This proverb is recognizable as a saying that is not only applicable to books. The base meaning 
of (49) can be found in (50). 
(50)  Don’t judge [something or someone] by the outward appearance. 
The base meaning in (50) is an explicature of the proverb in (49) because it is its 
conventionalized meaning in the lexicon. The form of (49) carries the meaning in (50) for native 
English speakers. While (50) may be an explicature of (49), the meaning in (50) is likely not the 
first interpretation that the hearer will conclude from (49). When hearing a proverb, it is the 
implicature that is typically the most relevant part of what is communicated. 
In order to clarify what is meant by the intended meaning of a proverb, I will be using 
Ariel’s concept of Privileged Interactional Interpretation (Ariel 2002, 2008). She states that this 
“is the meaning which the speaker is seen as minimally and necessarily committed to, i.e. the one 
by which she is judged as telling the truth or being sincere” (Ariel 2008: 299). It is the meaning 
that is relevant in the communication. While this is most often an explicature (2008: 305), 
proverbs tend to diverge from this pattern. I am not arguing that the base meaning of a proverb is 
the same as the intended meaning of a proverb (i.e. its Privileged Interactional Interpretation). 
Instead, the base meaning is an explicature that is communicated but is not necessarily the most 
relevant interpretation in context (in contrast to idioms (Section 4.2), for example). 
It is far more relevant for a hearer to understand a strong implicature communicated by 
(49) in a specific context. For example, let’s say I go to a local coffee shop, feeling a bit hungry, 
and I take a longing look at the pastries available for purchase. I really want a donut, but there is 
only one type of donut available and it does not look appetizing. The barista may see me eyeing 
this donut and say (51). 
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(51)  Don’t judge a book by its cover. 
  What would be relevant in this utterance? Obviously, the barista is not talking about a 
book; he or she is talking about the donuts. What is most relevant to me (the hearer) is not the 
explicature given in (50), but an application of that meaning to the current context. Perhaps, I 
should think twice before rejecting the donut. A likely strong implicature of the barista’s 
comment is noted in (52). 
(52)  Don’t judge that donut by the way it looks. 
Ad hoc meaning construction (see 4.4) allows for broadening and/or narrowing of concepts in 
online processing. For example, the concept COVER which appears in (51) is broadened through 
ad hoc meaning construction to include the concept OUTWARD APPEARANCE as in (50); OUTWARD 
APPEARANCE can in turn be broadened to include FIRST IMPRESSION. Other implicatures that may 
arise in the context given above are those in (53). 
(53) a. The donut tastes great 
b. Your impression of the donut should not be informed by the presentation of the donut 
c. The donut will taste better than you expect. 
d. You should try the donut [despite its appearance]. 
e. You should think twice before rejecting the donut. 
All or some of the implicatures may occur to the hearer of (51) and they are indeed implicatures 
if they were intended to be communicated by the speaker of (51). These potential implicatures 
are potential meanings that the proverb don’t judge a book by its cover may generate.  
What about the analogic mapping discussed in 3.4? In this example, some connections 
are readily apparent. The book is the donut and the cover is the appearance of the donut. Using 
Seitel’s notation, the relationship between A and B (the book and its cover) is analogous to the 
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relationship between C and D (the donut and its appearance). This relationship between A:B and 
C:D (that of judging) is communicated in the explicature in (50) and in the implicature in (52). 
This kind of analogic mapping can be explained through Relevance Theory’s ad hoc meaning 
construction where metaphor is seen as an expansive broadening of ad hoc meaning construction 
(Wilson & Carston 2007: 10). 
 In summary, when hearing a proverb it is the implicature that is typically the most 
relevant part of the communicative act, its Privileged Interactional Interpretation. The base 
meaning, or explicature, of the proverb is likely not retrieved until later, if at all. The following 
section will provide a more detailed comparison of proverbs to idioms within the Relevance-
Theoretic framework. 
4.2 Proverbs and idioms 
One question for Relevance Theory is whether or not the understood traditional meaning of the 
proverb should belong to the category of explicature or implicature. We will treat the base 
meaning of the proverb in the same way we could treat a conventional, dead metaphor, one that 
has been used often enough to allow for unambiguous interpretation. This is one way in which 
proverbs are similar to idioms. Idioms are strings of words that have become lexicalized as a unit 
and do not necessarily have a one-to-one correspondence between meaning and form. 
Much of the work on idioms within Relevance Theory has been done by Vega-Moreno 
(2003). Her main tenet is that “idiom comprehension, like utterance comprehension more 
generally, is not literal or figurative but relevance-driven” (2003: 315). The starting point for this 
discussion is narrowing down how idioms are interpreted. However, this is not so simple. This is 
because idioms vary in a lot of ways; some are non-compositional, some are partly 
compositional, some are static, some are not. 
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Compositionality is the idea that we derive meaning from the constituent parts of a 
sentence and “compose” them to develop the meaning of the utterance. Within a traditional view 
of idioms, the idea of compositionality is not compatible with idioms; idioms are treated as a full 
and complete unit in the lexicon where meaning is derived from only the idiom as a whole. This 
is likely because certain examples are frequently cited which are only representative of a smaller 
set of idioms. Some of these examples are given in (54). 
(54) a. kick the bucket 
 b. chew the fat 
 c. shoot the breeze (Vega-Moreno 2003: 306) 
While some idioms are indeed non-compositional (e.g., kick, the, and bucket are not useful in 
determining the meaning of kick the bucket (Vega-Moreno 2003: 304)), many require some 
amount of compositionality in order to interpret them. For example, miss the boat retains the 
semantics of miss and can be applied metaphorically to a specific context (e.g. missing a 
deadline). The idioms in (54) are the exception rather than the rule. Vega-Moreno notes that kick 
the bucket, while a popular example, is not representative of all idioms; she states that “for most 
idioms, we can establish some relation between their meaning and their form” (2003: 304), such 
as the idioms in (55). 
(55) a. pop the question 
 b. miss the boat 
 c. cry your eyes out 
It is easy to see how proverbs and idioms may be alike, and in some respects they are. 
According to Norrick (2014), as mentioned in 3.1, idioms fall under the category of proverbial 
phrases because they do not make a complete sentence on their own (e.g. see (54) and (55)). In 
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fact, Norrick goes on to say that proverbs are idioms in that “they have SPIs [base meanings] 
which are distinct from the literal readings which would be assigned to them on the basis of 
straightforward compositional semantic principles” (1985: 3). However, there is more to the 
distinction between proverbs and proverbial phrases, as will be shown in this section.  
Vega-Moreno lists a couple of major traits of idioms which we will be applying to 
proverbs as well: analyzability (i.e. compositionality) and transparency (2003: 306). 
Idioms lie on a continuum of compositionality (2003: 305) where some are more 
compositional than others. If proverbs were placed on this spectrum, they would be partly 
compositional. For example, in (56) the constituents flock together are useful in determining the 
meaning of the proverb (i.e. they are compositional) whereas of a feather will require implicit 
knowledge of the proverb in order to interpret it (i.e. non-compositional). 
(56) Birds of a feather flock together. 
Proverbs will likely be more compositional than idioms because there is always a degree of 
metaphorical application of the form to the explicature and of the form to the current context.  
Because of this dual nature of proverbs, meaning needs to be more apparent and 
analyzable so that it could at least be explained in context if the hearer happens to be unfamiliar 
with it. Idioms are more unidimensional which leads to a greater chance of non-compositional 
idioms. 
Vega-Moreno states that idioms vary in terms of their transparency (2003: 316), that is, in 
terms of how easy it is to infer conclusions from any given idiom within a given context. 
Proverbs will also vary in terms of transparency, although to a different degree. For both 
proverbs and idioms, there will be some that a hearer will not be familiar with and have a harder 
time understanding; these cases are less transparent and for the same reason (lack of familiarity). 
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However, proverbs are more likely to exhibit lesser degrees of transparency than idioms since 
proverbs are more complex. On the one hand, proverbs constitute an entire conversational 
contribution whereas idioms will constitute only a portion of a conversational contribution. 
Within a proverb, there is typically no grammatical expression referring to a particular referent in 
the context. Since idioms are part of a larger set of words, the lacking portions of the sentence 
(typically the subject of the sentence) will guide the hearer into a relevant understanding of what 
or whom the idiom is referring to. This is not always so clear in proverbs. For example, (57) and 
(58) represent examples of an idiom and a proverb respectively, without a given context. The 
referent for the pronoun he is more transparent in (57) than in (58) because he must have a real 
world referent for (57) where this is not the case for (58). 
(57) He was crying his eyes out. 
(58) He who hesitates is lost. 
Another difference between idioms and proverbs is in the stability of form. While idioms 
may have less flexibility in their meaning, they appear to be more flexible in their forms. 
Consider the idiom variations in (59; Vega-Moreno 2003: 304, 318). The idioms to leave no 
stone unturned and to pull strings have been enriched through the use of adjectives. 
(59) a. The most important thing is that we leave no legal stone unturned. 
 b. I think his father must have pulled a few political strings to get him out of jail. 
 c. He didn’t spill a single bean. 
While proverbs are not completely static, the variation in forms is usually quite small. (See 
Silverman-Weinreich (1978) for an example of a language (Yiddish) with no variation.) One 
case of slight variations is shown by Mieder, Kingsbury, & Harder (1992: 265) who list 19 
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variations of the English proverb the grass is always greener on the other side of the fence. Some 
of these are shown in (60). 
(60) a. Grass always seems greener in foreign fields. 
 b. Grass is always greener on the other side of the fence. 
 c. Grass is always greener away from home. 
 d. Grass is always greener in somebody else’s backyard. 
 e. Grass is greener on the other side of the stream. 
 f. The grass is always greener in the next man’s yard. 
 g. The grass is always greener on the other man’s lawn. 
Most differences in this list are synonyms or near synonyms, such as yard, lawn, backyard, and 
pasture, etc. An example of another proverb is shown in (61). 
(61) You can’t teach an old dog new tricks. 
From 30 hits in the Corpus of Contemporary American English (COCA) database, the following 
list in (62) shows the only variations from the original form in (61). 
(62) a. The best way to teach an old dog new tricks. [Title of an article] 
 b. You can teach an old dog new tricks. 
 c. Teaching an old dog new tricks. [Title of an article] 
 d. It’s tough to teach an old dog new turns. 
 e. It’s hard to sell an old dog new ticks. 
 f. … hard to teach an old dog new tricks. 
There is one cited example which has a play on words (62e; It’s hard to sell an old dog new 
ticks), called an anti-proverb, which is the only example which gives new meaning. However, the 
intended interpretation is the play on words rather than an enriched meaning of the proverb. The 
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other salient difference is those utterances which include can instead of can’t (62b). This draws 
the attention to the fact that the proverb may not in fact be a universal truth and may shift the 
focus to the explicature of the proverb as well as its strong implicature. 
We have seen that proverbs have less variation in form than idioms but they have a far 
greater variation in meaning. This major difference between idioms and proverbs comes down to 
the nature of the Privileged Interactional Interpretation. In general, the intended meaning that a 
speaker conveys with an idiom is an explicature and the intended meaning the speaker conveys 
with a proverb is an implicature. For example consider (63) and (64) from Vega-Moreno (2003: 
320-321). 
(63) After the Paddington derailment, trains arrive at a snail’s pace. 
(64) After she broke her hip, my grandma walks at a snail’s pace. 
The idiom at a snail’s pace means “slow” or “very slow”. This is part of the explicature 
communicated by the utterance and that explicature remains the same in both (63) and (64); it is 
also the Privileged Interactional Interpretation of at a snail’s pace. There are implicatures of 
course, and these differ between (63) and (64), most notably, the relative speed at which each of 
the subjects travel (e.g. slow for a train is much faster than slow for grandma). Likewise, (65) 
and (66) show a similar contrast with the idiom in the twinkling of an eye. 
(65) My husband is very handy. He painted the house in the twinkling of an eye. 
(66) My husband got dressed in the twinkling of an eye. (Vega-Moreno 2003: 321) 
For each of these idioms, the explicature is “very fast”, but again the relative speed will differ. 
With idioms, the meaning that the speaker is trying to convey does not typically change from 
context to context (at least on the level of explicature which I am arguing is the Privileged 
Interactional Interpretation for idioms). 
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 Meaning derivation is different with proverbs. For proverbs, the Privileged Interactional 
Interpretation changes with the context and is typically a strong implicature as in (53) above. As 
another example, compare the proverb given in (67) and (68), each with a different context. 
(67) A: I am thinking about applying for a job at the local café. 
 B: But you’ve never been there before. Look before you leap. 
 
(68) A: I am thinking about applying for a job at the local café. 
B: Won’t that put you in the hole? Look before you leap. 
 
While the explicature of look before you leap is something similar to consider X before 
committing to X, the primary communication is the implicature in each of these contexts. For 
(67), B is bringing attention to the fact that A might want to spend some time at the café before 
applying for the job; this is part of the strong implicature and the intended communication. In 
(68), the cautionary advice has to do with the state of A’s finances if he chooses to accept the 
job; A may want to count the cost of applying for the job. Notice how (68) also includes an 
idiom (in the hole) which will have an explicature of being in debt or short on cash. 
Along a similar vein of comparison, Kirshenblatt-Gimblett (1973: 115-118) provides 
eight different contexts in which the proverb money talks could be used and understood 
differently. She notes that while the base meaning remains the same, the interpretation of the 
utterance is different in each new context. 
Finally, another similarity between idioms and proverbs is the abundance of figurative 
language. As we will see in the following section, Relevance Theory does not treat metaphor as a 
special kind of language use but as a broadening of concepts (something which is done naturally 
on a smaller scale in most speech). Vega-Moreno notes that “idiom strings, both in their standard 
and variant forms, can be seen to involve just the same mechanisms as are employed in arriving 
54 
  
at the meaning intended by literally, loosely, hyperbolically and metaphorically used words” 
(2003: 312). 
Table 2 provides a summary and comparison of the distinctions between proverbs and 
idioms, especially under Relevance Theory.  
Table 2 Proverbs and idioms 
 Proverbs Idioms 
Form relatively fixed form relatively more flexible 
(with some exceptions) 
Utterance meaning varies in context relatively fixed 
Compositionality partly compositional partly compositional 
(with some exceptions) 
Completeness makes conversational 
contribution on its own 
requires additional morphosyntax 
to make a conversational 
contribution 
Communicated 
assumptions 
communicates at least one strong 
implicature and one strong 
explicature 
communicates at least one strong 
explicature 
Privileged 
Interactional 
Interpretation 
 
implicature 
 
explicature 
 
4.3 Proverbs and metaphor 
Sperber & Wilson (2008) argue that metaphor is not as special or unique as it may seem. The 
meanings of words are in constant flux from context to context and strictly literal definitions are 
in fact hard to come by. This section will expand on the introduction of Relevance Theory and 
metaphor from Section 2.3.2 and discuss the ways in which Relevance Theory would account for 
metaphor in proverbs. 
Again, Relevance Theory takes the perspective that there is a continuum between literal 
and figurative uses of language and that utterances will not always fit easily on one side or the 
other. This is also true of proverbs, where some are more figurative than others. However, it is 
not our concern with whether or not a proverb employs figurative language, since language will 
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be dealt with in generally the same way no matter where it falls on the spectrum (see ad hoc 
concept formation in section 4.4). In fact, it has been found that in many cases, processing time 
of literal utterances is not any faster than for figurative utterances (Gibbs 2001). The focus of 
Relevance Theory in these cases is to determine the broadening and narrowing of certain 
concepts within the utterance as it is being interpreted in the current context. 
Sperber & Wilson’s (2008) article “A deflationary account of metaphor” argues that 
metaphors are not a special kind of speech form and do not require a separate theory in order to 
be understood: “there is no mechanism specific to metaphor, no interesting generalisation that 
applies only to them.” (2008: 84). With this in mind, our pragmatic theoretical applications 
should involve a similar process for metaphors as for other speech forms. 
Sperber & Wilson state that “human communication is inferential communication” 
(2008: 87) rather than a code (where a stimulus encodes a message and the hearer decodes it). A 
code would imply a simple one-to-one correspondence of units of speech to meaning. In the case 
of metaphor, this correspondence leads to associations between the word and related words. For 
example, let’s examine the phrase in (69). 
(69) Woman to uncouth suitor: Keep your paws off me! (Sperber & Wilson 2008: 101) 
With an associationist account, paws may offer several connotations such as clumsiness or 
bestiality which attach themselves to the meaning meant by paws in (69) which is HAND. And so, 
the original literal meaning of paws is discarded in favor of what it is associated with. Sperber & 
Wilson opt for an inferential approach; they find it odd that the original meaning of paw should 
disappear especially since there may be more subtle inferences that are communicated (2008: 
101). A metaphor gives rise to many weak implicatures (and often some strong ones too) which 
are present as the hearer searches for the most relevant interpretation of the utterance. 
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 And so, Relevance Theory claims that a new concept PAWS* is developed in the midst of 
the communication act. This new concept carries with it the connotations of paws which are 
weakly implicated (2008: 102) as well as broadening to include the hearer’s hands as part of the 
definition. Most metaphors include a broadening of a certain concept to derive their ad hoc 
concepts. 
In Section 4.1, we saw that the concept COVER from the proverb don’t judge a book by its 
cover is broadened to the concept of OUTWARD APPEARANCE. Thus, a new concept COVER* is 
being communicated in the utterance of the proverb. Let us now look at another proverb, below 
in (70). This conversation occurred on PBS NewsHour (July 20, 2017) where the hosts were 
discussing the potential threats of artificial intelligence. 
(70)  [Referring to future A.I.]: Well, it could start a war by create – by doing fake news and 
spoofing e-mail accounts and fake press releases, and just by, you know, manipulating 
information. The pen is mightier than the sword. (COCA) 
 
There are several metaphors at play in the proverb in (70). Here, we begin with the metaphor 
where PEN stands in for a related concept WRITTEN WORDS and SWORD which stands in for 
PHYSICAL HARM. But the interpretation does not stop there; a new concept PEN* emerges which is 
broadened to include the workings of a pen (i.e. the written word) as well as specific examples of 
words, none of which actually need a pen to create (e.g. news, e-mail, press release). The first 
broadening is for the base meaning of the proverb and the second broadening is for its 
implicature, relevant to the context. It is hard to imagine A.I. using pens to communicate. While 
broadening the notion of PEN* to include items which are written, PEN*is further broadened to 
include COMMUNICATION since physical written materials are not what have the power to 
overcome the sword in this proverb. The concept SWORD is likewise broadened, although with 
less detail, but it does implicate that the threatening A.I. has the ability or possibility to induce 
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physical harm. The connotations of violence from SWORD will remain attached to the new 
concept SWORD*. 
 The above explanation included the interpretation of a metaphor within the proverb. Of 
course, proverbs apply metaphorically to the current situation. Here is an example of metaphor in 
a proverb that does so from NBC Today (May 11, 2004) in (71). The context is when a talk-show 
guest, Dr. Saltz, is discussing a self-help topic about change. 
(71)  You can go to all the therapy in the world and … as the saying goes, you can lead a 
horse to water but you can’t make them drink. (COCA) 
 
In this example, there are several layers to the base meaning. First of all, there is the explicature 
of this proverb, its meaning outside of a particular context. This explicature is represented in 
(72). 
(72)  You can bring X [something or someone] to Y [goal or destination] but you can’t make 
them partake of Y. 
 
Then, there are further inferences that can be drawn from the base meaning without bringing up 
the current context. This base meaning of this proverb carries a further strong implicature that is 
communicated. This strong implicature is along the lines of (73). 
(73)  It is the responsibility of X [alone] to partake of Y. 
How do we arrive at this interpretation? The concept of HORSE is broadened to include certain 
characteristics of being led or guided, being under authority yet having independence, and so on. 
These qualities allow for the new concept HORSE* to include human beings as part of its concept. 
The connotations that carry over from HORSE are enriched by the concept of LEAD as the 
preceding verb. If a horse is being led, that means someone has authority over it, and in this case 
the person leading the horse knows what the horse’s needs are (i.e. water). 
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 When it comes to the Privileged Interactional Interpretation, the most basic meaning that 
the speaker is trying to communicate, we may arrive at something like (74). 
(74)  You can lead people to the self-help they need, but you can’t make them use that help. 
In this context, that help is the knowledge and wisdom that Dr. Saltz is sharing on the news 
show. The point she is sharing is that it is up to the horse to drink the water, or that person to 
apply the wisdom to turn their life around. Here we have the application of the proverb by 
analogy to a current situation. The discussion will now turn to ad hoc concept formation more 
broadly. 
4.4 Ad hoc concept formation 
Many philosophers have exposed the problem that meaning construal is often complex; for 
example, Wittgenstein states that “the functions of words are as diverse as the functions of” tools 
in a toolbox (1953: 6). While words may seem conventional on the surface, such that our inner 
lexicon will determine their meanings, there is a lot more lurking underneath – especially when 
context is taken into account. As a further note from Wittgenstein, he admits that “what confuses 
us is the uniform appearance of words when we hear them spoken or meet them in script and 
print. For their application is not presented to us so clearly” (1953: 6; emphasis in original). 
One of the more recent developments within Relevance Theory is the theoretical 
description of how the meanings of words are adjusted in context to fit a more specific meaning 
than their lexically coded definitions. The idea is that within a context, words become narrowed, 
broadened, or develop a concept that is specific to the situation at hand. This follows the work of 
Wilson & Carston (2007) whereby they attribute this ad hoc concept formation to the expectation 
of relevance. Within lexical pragmatics, words have a basic, lexically encoded meaning (an 
encyclopedic definition) which is then either broadened, narrowed, or loosened in its properties; 
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this is part and parcel of achieving a relevant implication of the proposition expressed. Consider 
the loosening of flat in (75). 
(75) Holland is flat. (Clark 2013: 248) 
Flat is not taken as literally flat; a hearer would not expect to arrive at that interpretation of FLAT 
based on the context of the utterance. It does not fit within the realm of relevance, nor is it a 
Privileged Interactional Interpretation. What would be more appropriate within a Relevance-
Theoretic account would be to develop certain implications from the description of Holland as 
flat as in (76) (Clark 2013: 249). 
(76) a. Holland is not mountainous. 
 b. The views in Holland will be those of a relatively flat landscape. 
 c. It would be relatively easy to cycle around Holland. 
There may be many more implications to the utterance in (75); however, what is clear is that a 
certain concept FLAT* is being developed in the interpretation of the utterance which is particular 
to a description of Holland, and perhaps more generally to a country or landscape. The original 
concept FLAT has thus been loosened. An example of narrowing can be found in (77). 
(77) My friend Sally is moving to London. Do you think you could introduce her to some 
men? (Clark 2013: 248) 
 
Here, there is a concept MEN* that is developed specific to this context and that is narrower than 
the lexically defined concept of MEN. It is likely that Sally wants to be introduced to men who are 
single, available, looking for a relationship etc. This narrows the concept in context. 
It was briefly mentioned in Chapter 2 that Relevance Theory could account for loose talk 
more readily than Gricean pragmatics. This is because Relevance Theory deals with an 
approximation of the speaker’s meaning rather than merely the literal proposition. As Wilson & 
Carston state, “the ad hoc concepts created by the pragmatic interpretation of individual words 
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and phrases are seen as constituents of the proposition the speaker is taken to have expressed, 
rather than merely contributing to implicatures, as in the standard Gricean account” (2007: 3-4). 
Similar ideas have been espoused in the past, for example, by Whorf (1942) who uses the 
term “elastic meaning”. For Whorf, any word can stretch and expand to fit the context at hand – 
meanings are never determinate. From the work of Ludlow (2014), a philosopher of Generative 
Linguistics, an argument arises that meanings are negotiated and ad hoc meaning boundaries are 
created in the midst of a conversation whether consciously or subconsciously. This means that 
language used in a particular context may broaden and narrow in meaning until some sort of 
conclusion is adhered to in that particular context. These ad hoc concepts are important in 
disambiguating the meaning of underdetermined lexemes, and Wilson & Carston (2007: 3) note 
that this may in fact pertain to all lexemes.  
Here is another example: the word raw in the steak is raw (Clark 2013: 272) does not 
mean that the steak is completely raw in the context of a patron stating this after being served a 
steak in a restaurant. The intended meaning is that the steak is rawer than the eater expected (but 
still likely cooked enough for serving standards). In this instance, RAW* (i.e. rawer than the 
speaker expects) would be a concept applied to the lexical item raw for this particular context 
only. These adjusted concepts are also theoretically tied to interpreting utterances of metaphor. 
4.4.1 Broadening and narrowing 
It is important to note that narrowing is not the same as disambiguation (Wilson & Carston 2007: 
19). Disambiguation has to do with choosing one of multiple different definitions (i.e. lexical 
entries) for a word. Narrowing begins with the lexical entry of the word and then narrows the 
concept into something more specific to fit the current context. Disambiguation will have already 
happened by the time the concept itself is narrowed. However, narrowing will include 
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interpreting one standard encyclopedic definition into a more specific context use (e.g. fresh 
water, fresh laundry, fresh idea etc.). 
Wilson & Carston (2007) argue that narrowing/broadening is inferential rather than non-
inferential. Inferential is logical; association is automatic. The inferential account is by default 
stronger merely because an associationist account will overgenerate the possibilities that are 
considered in the brain. If there are many possibilities considered, then there must be some rules 
as to how to remove some of them. According to Relevance Theory, “hearers have an automatic 
inferential heuristic for constructing the best interpretation given the evidence available to them” 
(Wilson & Carston 2007: 20). On associationist accounts, they state that “if the only associations 
exploited in lexical adjustment are inferential ones which narrow or broaden the denotation of 
the encoded concept, purely or partly associative accounts will vastly overgenerate, and some 
method for filtering out unwanted associations will be required” (Wilson & Carston 2007: 35). 
Relevance Theory constrains the amount of logical inferences of a particular utterance by the 
principles of relevance. According to a hearer’s expectations of relevance, they will be guided 
towards the most relevant ad hoc concept. 
Seitel makes a comment on the constraint of certain concepts in his analysis of proverbs: 
“each term [in a proverb] may have a very large number of features associated with it, but when 
[they] are part of the same stated situation, only certain of the features apply” (1969: 136). He 
compares the use of child in the proverbs in (78) and (79). 
(78)  You can’t send a child to do a man’s work. 
(79)  A child on its mother’s back does not know the way is long. (1969: 136) 
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In (78), there are certain senses of the concept CHILD which are brought into focus, such as 
incompetence. In (79), other senses of CHILD come to mind such as ignorance. These are 
examples of narrowing and these add to the implicature of the utterance. 
 And so, when it comes to proverbs, many lexical items are adjusted ad hoc concepts like 
in the examples above. Let’s consider an adjustment of TIME in the proverb time flies in (80) 
through (82). 
(80) The day is over already? Time flies. 
(81) The semester is over already? Time flies. 
(82) My daughter moved out of our home last week. I can still remember holding her in my 
arms. Time flies. 
 
In (80), the time period denoted in the utterance of the proverb is hours, in (81) it is months, and 
in (82) the time period denoted may be a couple of decades. In each, the concept of TIME is 
adjusted and narrowed to fit the context. The difference in the amount of time between these 
three cases is significant. The implicatures derived by the hearer will likely include the amount 
of time that has passed as in (83). 
(83) a. Time [hours] passes quickly. 
 b. Time [months] passes quickly. 
 c. Time [years] passes quickly. 
With this proverb, one would not expect the utterance of time flies in (80) to have the same 
implication as (82). This is a case of lexical narrowing wherein each different utterance of time 
has a narrowed ad hoc concept TIME* denoting the relative length of time that is meant by the 
speaker. 
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In the next example in (84), the context is taken from a magazine about astronomy which, 
in one of its articles, featured a list of ways to get more out of the hobby via Facebook (COCA; 
April 2012).  
(84) Pictures are worth a thousand words. Try posting a small photo album or three that 
relate to astronomy. Facebook has made it easy and then you can just watch the 
comments roll in. 
 
The speaker is commenting on the fact that sometimes a visual representation of something is 
more informative than would be words that represent the same thing. This is part of the base 
meaning of the proverb. What is meant by a thousand words? Here we have a case of hyperbole. 
According to Relevance Theory, hyperbole is, again, not a unique phenomenon requiring its own 
theory. Instead it can be explained through ad hoc concept formation as a case of lexical 
broadening or loosening. Obviously, the speaker is not meaning that a picture is worth exactly 
one thousand words, no more and no less; how would one calculate that value anyway? Instead, 
the expression is used to mean any of (85). 
(85) a. many words 
 b. many, many words 
 c. countless words 
A THOUSAND WORDS is thus loosened to [A THOUSAND WORDS]* where the exact count is not 
relevant but the significance of the amount is relevant. Here is another example of the proverb, 
this time including a broadening of the concept PICTURE in (86). 
(86)  I wasn’t sure he loved her, but then I saw them hugging at the airport. A picture is worth 
a thousand words.
1
 
 
                                                 
1
 https://www.engvid.com/english-resource/50-common-proverbs-sayings/ 
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What is interesting in this utterance of the proverb compared to (84) is that picture does not refer 
here to a literal picture; instead, through ad hoc concept formation, the lexically encoded concept 
PICTURE is adjusted and broadened to include ideas like: 
(87) a. A visual representation 
 b. A visual scene 
 c. A (relatively) static moment in time 
All of these highly relevant notions of PICTURE are accessed in order to come up with the 
implication that the speaker’s seeing the two people hug in the airport is a PICTURE. This leads to 
the ad hoc concept PICTURE* in the utterance of (86) which is extended to meaning a visual scene 
or a moment in time, not necessarily a photograph nor something that is painted or designed. 
Reexamining the use of a thousand words, the emphasis must be on how a visual 
representation can achieve more than words could achieve, especially in the given scenario. 
Perhaps the speaker of (86) could have described the situation in words in (88) of the scene at the 
airport. 
(88) Because of the way they hugged when they saw each other, I could tell that they loved 
each other. 
 
This sentence has exactly 19 words and probably described the scene sufficiently enough. 
However, the use of the proverb denotes that the visual scene had meaning that was deeper (and 
more emotional) than mere words can describe, or that the scene was more succinct in its 
meaning than words would be, or even that the scene was able to communicate aspects of love 
that the speaker thought not possible to do so in words. This is a particularly interesting proverb 
in terms of Relevance Theory because it speaks to Relevance Theory’s main principles: a picture 
achieves more cognitive effects for less processing effort than many words. 
We will look at one more case of broadening in the proverb in (89). 
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(89) Beggars can’t be choosers. 
A lexical entry of beggar includes the descriptions in (90). 
(90) a. Someone who begs for money. 
 b. Someone who is not well off. 
 c. Someone who is in need. 
 d. Someone who is in a bad situation. 
This sense of BEGGAR in (89) is broadened to include not only those who are in need of money 
but those who may need something (or are asking for something) and are not in a position to 
attain it on their own. The number of options available to them may be limited, or in fact may 
only be one as in (91). 
(91) I was unemployed, and they offered me a job cleaning toilets. I didn’t like the job, but I 
accepted it. Beggars can’t be choosers. 
 
Because the speaker is unemployed, he or she feels like there are not many options in terms of 
what they can do and so must accept an unsatisfying job. For the speaker and addressee, there 
must be a new concept BEGGAR* that emerges in a search for relevance over the Privileged 
Interactional Interpretation. This new concept includes someone who is in a difficult situation, 
someone with few choices, etc. 
4.5 More examples 
This section will include several examples from other languages in order to bolster the set of data 
provided by this thesis. Let us begin with an example that is overall more literal than figurative. 
Penfield & Duru’s (1988) investigation of Igbo (Niger-Congo) dealt mainly with proverbs 
uttered to children. As such, many of the proverbs they gathered used less figurative language 
than the average Igbo proverb so as to be more easily intelligible to children. (92) was uttered by 
a parent to children of about five years of age. 
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(92) I am telling you now with my one finger; do not allow me to bring out my five fingers. 
(Penfield & Duru 1988: 125) 
 
This proverb is a verbal warning to correct behavior; the consequence of further disobedience 
will be spanking (i.e. five fingers). The child must interpret the utterance first by noting that it is 
worth paying attention to, then achieving the relevant cognitive effects for the least effort. If the 
parent is wagging one finger at the child, waving four more fingers at him is likely not the 
intended punishment. The child realizes that this would not be the intended cognitive effect; the 
five fingers will represent something more. Because this proverb is engrained in the culture, the 
appropriate equating of the five fingers to spanking is likely conventionalized. The Privileged 
Interactional Interpretation that the child assesses as relevant might be (93). 
(93)  Stop that behavior. 
This is likely the strongest implicature of (92) in the situation. The implicature in (93) is not a 
part of the proposition expressed in (92) but it is the inferred meaning of that utterance. There 
may be further implicatures such as the list in (94) that may arise as the child considers the 
proverb. 
(94) a. Stop that behavior. 
b. I do not like your behavior 
 c. Your behavior is not acceptable to me. 
 d. If you continue that behavior, you will receive a spanking. 
Let us consider another example from Igbo. The proverb in (95) is also a warning and includes 
metaphor. 
(95) A rat which does not listen to warnings will listen when he’s in a pot of soup. (Penfield & 
Duru 1988: 126) 
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In contrast to (94), this proverb is uttered towards the child when they are engaging in a behavior 
that would put them in danger; the dangerous situation is salient when interpreting the pot of 
soup. What could be a possible base meaning of the utterance? First of all, we must determine 
the relationship between the proverb and the context. The rat is the child, and the pot of soup is 
the harmful outcome. This would suggest that the base meaning of (95) could read something 
like (96). 
(96) A person (or child) that does not listen to warnings, will listen when they receive the 
harmful outcome of their behavior. 
 
The strongly communicated implicature is below in (97). 
(97) That behavior is dangerous. 
The implicatures for (95) will be similar to those in (94) but not entirely. The command to stop 
the behavior is less obvious, but it may be in the implicature. This is because (92) is uttered in 
the moment in which the behavior must stop and (95) may be uttered when talking about a 
behavior that the child has done in the past. Possible implicatures of (95) are listed in (98). 
(98) a. Stop that behavior. 
 b. You should listen to verbal warnings. 
 c. Dire situations are fast teachers. 
Lastly, we have a proverb from Yoruba in Arewa & Dundes (1964). Typically, the 
proverb in (99) is uttered from one parent to the other about how one’s behavior as the parent 
may transfer to the child. 
(99)  The offspring of an elephant cannot become a dwarf; the offspring of an elephant is like 
an elephant. (Arewa & Dundes 1964: 75) 
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The context given is a father who acts out in anger and then is disappointed when his son acts the 
same way. The mother could reprove the father with (99).  The explicature of the utterance may 
be along the lines of (100). 
(100) The child of a parent who behaves in one way will not behave another way; the child of a 
parent who is one way will be the same as the parent. 
 
It may even be lexicalized as something simpler as in (101). 
(101) The child will be like the parent. It cannot be different. 
And the Privileged Interactional Interpretation may be something like (102). 
(102) Your child will act the way you act. 
The implicature of the utterance of this proverb includes the identification of the offspring with 
the parents’ son, thus the inclusion of your in (102) as this would be relevant in the exchange. 
Following this, there are several potential weaker implicatures that may be communicated as 
well, shown in (103). 
(103) a. You should be careful about the way you act in front of our children. 
 b. It is your own fault for being disappointed about our son’s behavior. 
4.6 Summary 
Beginning with the Privileged Interactional Interpretation, we have seen how utterances of 
proverbs will typically communicate a strong implicature as their intended meaning. Hearers find 
optimal relevance not in the form of the proverb but in its application to the current context. 
 The biggest contribution of Relevance Theory to the interpretation of proverbs is likely 
the development of ad hoc concept formation. In most cases, lexical items in proverbs are 
broadened (while some are narrowed) to create concepts that will satisfy the presumption of 
optimal relevance. 
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 I have shown that proverbs and idioms have more differences than earlier analyses 
suggest (e.g. Norrick 1985, 2014). I have made the claim that proverbs are unique in that they 
will reliably provide a strong implicature as the Privileged Interactional Interpretation and I have 
shown how Relevance Theory can account for proverbs in everyday conversation. The 
following, concluding chapter will tie together earlier pragmatic theories of proverbs with the 
conclusions of the current thesis. 
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5. Conclusion 
Aasland has noted that “generally, proverb scholars have come out too much on one side or the 
other. Either they overemphasize the importance of the generic interpretation(s) or they give all 
center stage to the performative aspects of proverb usage” (2012: 24). It was my goal in this 
thesis to bring both of these aspects together with equal weight. I have done so by expressing the 
importance of the generic interpretation as a strong explicature and the contextual interpretation 
as a strong implicature. 
 If Relevance Theory is robust enough to account for the pragmatics of understanding and 
language use, then it should be more than able to account for proverbs. This was shown through 
Relevance Theory’s use of explicatures and implicatures as well as its description of ad hoc 
concept formation. The metaphorical nature and loose talk that is found in proverbs is explained 
by broadening and/or narrowing the concepts represented with the proverb itself. These 
meanings are expanded through the intentions of the speaker in specific contexts. This thesis has 
also compared proverbs with Relevance Theory’s explanation of a related linguistic 
phenomenon: idioms. Idioms are similar to proverbs in that they are conventional, often 
metaphoric phrases; however, they do not make a conversational contribution on their own and 
their meaning is much more fixed and more tied to the explicature of the utterance when 
compared to proverbs. 
 The major claim of this thesis was that the meaning of a proverb in context contains at 
least one strong implicature and one explicature, where the implicature is the Privileged 
Interactional Interpretation. 
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5.1 Questions and limitations 
One question that arises is whether or not proverbs should be considered a special type or 
category under a Relevance-Theoretic account. Since Relevance Theory does not commit to 
stating that metaphor is a special type (e.g. Sperber & Wilson 2008), why should proverbs be 
granted this honour? Within the hypothesis provided by this thesis, I have shown that there are 
unique characteristics that apply to proverbs which do not apply to other linguistic expressions, 
such as idioms. Due to the fact that there are specific elements of the proverb (e.g. a strong 
explicature that is not the Privileged Interactional Interpretation and a strong implicature that is), 
it would be safe to place proverbs in their own category under Relevance Theory until more 
comparisons to other linguistic phenomena are made. 
 One limit to the current study is the lack of attention to novel proverbs. A proverb can be 
novel in a certain context either because the hearer is not familiar with it or because the proverb 
is relatively new in the life of the language. The former category could include created proverbs 
in fiction as well. In utterances of novel proverbs, Relevance Theory would treat their 
interpretation as creative metaphor and a hearer, in a search for optimal relevance, may recognize 
the cadence of the utterance as proverbial and search for more cognitive effects. I would 
theorize, if the communication is successful, that the hearer will arrive at a base meaning for the 
proverb as well as a strong implicature of its application to the current context (see Katz & 
Ferretti 2001 for the on-line processing of context in novel proverbs). In the case of a novel 
proverb, the base meaning has much more relevance since it is needed in processing the intended 
interpretation of the proverb. That is, the base meaning is not lexicalized and thus will be 
actively processed. However, more research could be devoted to the interpretation of novel 
proverbs under Relevance Theory. 
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 Another area for further research is the application of this theory to other languages. As 
mentioned in the previous chapter, this will depend on a deep understanding of the language such 
that the proverbs are a part of the tacit knowledge of the researcher and/or participants. 
The current thesis contributes to and expands upon the research done in Relevance 
Theory to account for various linguistic phenomena. Proverbs hold a special place in many 
languages, and Relevance Theory can bring a deeper understanding of their use.
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Ramírez, Cristina Heras. 2015. A pragmatic approach to proverb use and interpretation. Cádiz: 
Universidad de Cádiz dissertation. 
 
Seitel, Peter. 1969. Proverbs: A social use of metaphor. Reprinted in Wolfgang Mieder & Alan 
Dundes (eds.), The wisdom of many: Essays on the proverb (1994), 122-139. Madison: 
The University of Wisconsin Press. 
 
Silverman-Weinreich, Beatrice. 1978. Towards a structural analysis of Yiddish proverbs. 
Reprinted in Wolfgang Mieder & Alan Dundes (eds.), The wisdom of many: Essays on 
the proverb (1994), 65-85. Wisconsin: The University of Wisconsin Press. 
 
Soi, Fancy Chepkoeck. A stylistic and pragmatic study of Kipsigis proverbs. Nairobi: University 
of Nairobi MA thesis. 
 
Sperber, Dan & Deirdre Wilson. 1986/1995. 2
nd
 edition. Relevance: Communication & 
Cognition. Malden: Blackwell Publishing. 
 
Sperber, Dan & Deirdre Wilson. 2008. A deflationary account of metaphors. In Raymond W. 
Gibbs, Jr. (ed.) The Cambridge handbok of metaphor and thought, 84-105. Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press. 
 
Taylor, Archer. 1931. The proverb. Cambridge: Harvard University Press. 
 
Taylor, Archer. 1962. The wisdom of many and the wit of one. Reprinted in Wolfgang Mieder & 
Alan Dundes (eds.), The wisdom of many: Essays on the proverb (1994), 3-9. Wisconsin: 
The University of Wisconsin Press. 
 
Van Lancker, Diana. 1990. The neurology of proverbs. Behavioural Neurology 3. 169-187. 
 
Vega-Moreno, Rosa Elena. Relevance theory and the construction of idiom meaning. UCL 
Working Papers in Linguistics 15. 303-323. 
 
Whorf, Benjamin Lee. 1942. Language, mind and reality. Theosophist 1942(1). 
 
77 
  
Wilson, Deirdre. 1995. Is there a maxim of truthfulness? UCL Working Papers in Linguistics 7. 
197-212. 
 
Wilson, Deirdre & Dan Sperber. 1981. On Grice’s theory of conversation. In Paul Werth (ed.), 
Conversation and discourse, 155-178. London: Croom Helm. 
 
Wilson, Deirdre & Robyn Carston. 2007. A unitary approach to lexical pragmatics: Relevance, 
inference and ad hoc concepts. https://www.researchgate.net/publication/239542817. 
 
Wilson, Freeda Catherine. 2009. A model for translating metaphors in proverbs (French to 
English): A cognitive descriptive approach. Kelowna: The University of British 
Columbia dissertation. 
 
Wittgenstein, Ludwig. 1953. In  G. E. M. Anscomb, R. Rhees, & G. H. von Wright (eds.).  
Philosophical investigation 3
rd
 ed. Oxford: Basil Blackwell. 
 
Yankah, Kwesi. 1984. Do proverbs contradict? Folklore Forum 17(1). 2-19. 
 
 
